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For urban policing, it is the best of times and the worst of times. The
innovative policing techniques that have come into widespread use over the
past decade are credited by many with producing significant reductions in
urban crime. The vocal and numerous critics of these tactics, however, claim
that the cure has been worse than the disease.
In recent years, big-city police have increasingly come to utilize a proactive
approach to policing, frequently labeled "problem-oriented policing."1 The
advocates of problem-oriented policing argue that rather than merely trying to
solve crimes after they are committed, the police should study crime patterns in
order to identify underlying conditions that stimulate the commission of crimes,
and then move proactively to eliminate them.2 One particularly important-and
controversial-problem-oriented approach is order-maintenance policing. This
approach is predicated on the view that visible signs of disorder on the
streetscape stimulate the commission of more serious crimes; therefore, an
order-maintenance strategy seeks to minimize visible disorder through
enforcement of curfew, truancy, anti-loitering, public intoxication and similar
public order laws. 3 Order-maintenance advocates credit these tactics as a major
force behind the precipitous reduction in the crime rate during the 1990s,
especially in New York City, where their use has been particularly aggressive
and widespread.4 Moreover, scholarly observers of urban policing are coming
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to agree that policing tactics contributed to the substantial declines in urban
crime rates experienced in the 1990s. 5 But this approach to urban policing is
not without its critics. Their essential argument is that this new brand of
aggressive policing imposes an extremely harsh regime of surveillance and
control, promotes heavy-handed police tactics based on highly ambiguous or
innocuous conduct, endorses racial profiling and similar abuses, and falls
disproportionately on persons of color.
6
The problems posed by proactive law enforcement are brought into even
sharper focus by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since then,
prominent among the investigative tactics adopted by the federal government
has been an effort to target non-citizens residing in the United States for special
scrutiny if they come from Middle Eastern nations in which anti-American
terrorist organizations have been known to operate.7 Yet this approach could
also be fairly characterized as discrimination on the basis of national origin;
indeed, many have attacked the law enforcement response to September 11 as
rife with improper racial profiling. 8 As Ibrahim Hooper of the Council on
American-Islamic Relations told The New York Times: "[T]o single people out
solely on their religion and ethnicity goes against longstanding values of equal
protection of the law."
9
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Hooper has a point. Any effort to make investigative decisions based on
race or national origin would seemingly violate the settled rule--derived from
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-that "the
Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations
such as race." 10 And yet, if an effort to target individuals of Middle Eastern
origin for special scrutiny is a prudent effort to allocate limited investigative
resources in a fashion most likely to prevent terrorist acts, then perhaps equal
protection should be understood to permit such targeting, especially in the face
of such a grave threat. After all, "while the Constitution protects against
invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact."' 1 Surely the specter of
terrorism should provoke us to ask whether the Constitution's promise of
"equal protection" is made only to those suspected of crime, or also involves
the "protection" that most of us seek from government against threats to public
safety.
The debate over the efficacy of a proactive, problem-oriented approach to
law enforcement-what some have called the "New Policing"12-is one that I
have entered elsewhere.' 3 1 will only touch on it here, using it as a starting point
for a broader inquiry into the constitutional principles at stake in the
formulation of law enforcement strategy. The constitutional argument against
proactive policing has undeniable force-no one can doubt, for example, that
order-maintenance tactics afford the police discretion to exert considerable
control over conduct that is frequently ambiguous or even innocuous. Similarly,
policies that encourage officers to target those who they believe are most likely
to be involved in criminal activities effectively enable police to act on the basis
of what may be little more than racial or ethnic prejudice.14 This problem is
10. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Discrimination on the basis of ancestry or
national origin is also treated as a racial classification. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514-17
(2000); Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). For an example of the kind of argument that can
be made against any consideration of race or ethnic origin when making investigative decisions based on
rather settled principles of equal protection jurisprudence, see David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by
Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 296, 322-29 (2001). At least one circuit seems to agree. See United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1131-35 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. deniedsub nom. Sanchez-Guillen v. United
States, 531 U.S. 889 (2000). Although by its terms the Equal Protection Clause only applies to the states,
an equivalent guarantee of equal protection has long been applied to the federal government through the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
11. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
12. There is no terribly precise definition of "New Policing," but in general that phrase is used to
refer to law enforcement tactics designed to prevent crime rather than to identify and prosecute
offenders after the fact. It therefore can include tactics ranging from the aggressive use of stop-and-frisk
tactics in high-crime neighborhoods to the provision of intensive social services to at-risk youth. See,
e.g., Heymann, supra note 5, at 422-41.
13. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Gang Loitering and Race, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99 (2000).
14. See, e.g., BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN
WINDOWS POLICING 166-79 (2001); David Cole, Foreword: Discretion and Discrimination
Reconsidered-A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1074-82
(1999); Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
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highlighted by the current state of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which
affords the police substantial discretion to search and seize individuals thought
to be acting suspiciously-authority frequently directed at persons of color.
15
The constitutional argument against racial profiling is powerful as well: the
Equal Protection Clause ordinarily forbids any use of race or national origin as
a basis for governmental decisionmaking, and there is little reason to believe
that this rule is less applicable to investigations focused on non-citizens thought
to hale from countries where terrorist groups are active than to any other law
enforcement context.1 6 Yet, for those of us actually engaged in law
enforcement in one capacity or another, there is a troubling sterility to most of
the academic attacks on prophylactic policing. All too often, they ignore one of
the powerful realities underlying preventative law enforcement strategies:
Reactive law enforcement strategies generally fail to provide truly "equal"
protection to all, but instead leave the poorest and most vulnerable among us
subject to a far greater risk of crime than the wealthy and powerful ever
experience.
In the post-September 11 landscape, proactive and prophylactic policing
seems especially appropriate. Nevertheless, advocates of that approach have yet
to make the case that New Policing can be reconciled with settled constitutional
principles. 17 It will be my task to attempt to reconcile with the Constitution a
prophylactic approach in which law enforcement can rely on proxies for likely
criminal activity-such as visible disorder, geography, or even, at least in some
circumstances, race or national origin-in order to prevent crime before it
occurs. I will do so by taking issue with the conventional notion that equal
protection calls for uniform law enforcement tactics. Instead, I will advocate
the perhaps surprising position that the Equal Protection Clause not only
tolerates, but may well require the use of non-uniform law enforcement
techniques in order to provide effectively equal protection from the threat of
crime.
Part I below outlines the New Policing debate as a backdrop for
consideration of the import of the Equal Protection Clause for law enforcement
strategy and tactics. Part II then advances an understanding of equal protection
Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 775, 799-818 (1999).
15. See, e.g., Tovah Renee Calderrn, Race-Based Policing from Terry to Wardlow: Steps Down the
Totalitarian Path, 44 HOW. L.J. 73 (2000).
16. For an illustration of the argument that can be made against consideration of race or national
origin in the context of immigration enforcement, relying on seemingly conventional principles of equal
protection jurisprudence, see Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000); Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in
America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825 (2001).
17. Indeed, it is striking how those willing to make the case for racial profiling tend to do so nearly
exclusively in terms of its efficacy. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 11l
YALE L.J. 2137 (2002); Heather MacDonald, The War on the Police, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 31, 2001,
at 26; Peter H. Schuck, A Case for Profiling, AM. LAW., Jan. 2002, at 59.
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quite different from its conventional characterization as a prohibition on
arbitrary or discriminatory governmental classifications. Instead, Part II
contends that the Equal Protection Clause is not merely prohibitory, but also
contains an affirmative command. This affirmative component identifies a
substantive good-security against lawbreakers-and commands that it be
provided to all residents of a jurisdiction equally. While institutional and
prudential concerns limit the courts' willingness to enforce this affirmative
aspect of equal protection, it fully binds the other branches of government.
Very often, government officials will find that they cannot discharge their
obligation to ensure that protection is "equal" unless they allocate resources in
a manner that recognizes that threats to public safety are not uniform--that is,
unless they employ non-uniform tactics. Part III attempts to apply this
understanding of equal protection to conventional policing-a largely reactive
strategy of uniform patrol and response to calls for police service. Although
this strategy seems to create a form of equal protection by making police
deployments and response appear uniform, I will argue that the equality that
conventional policing offers is frequently illusory. Among the insights that
underlie New Policing is that conventional policing will systematically
disadvantage poorer, less stable, and disproportionately minority
neighborhoods. For that reason, conventional policing may fail to provide
"equal protection" as that concept is described here. Part IV considers the
implications of an affirmative conception of equal protection for law
enforcement strategies that move beyond the conventional model by examining
policing styles, order-maintenance policing, and claims of discrimination in law
enforcement.
I. THE POLICING DEBATE
I begin with a brief summary of the debate among legal scholars over the
propriety of a prophylactic and proactive approach to policing. I will focus at
the outset on order-maintenance policing, not because the concerns addressed
here are limited to the debate about order maintenance, but because that debate
so well illustrates the character of legal debate over preventative law
enforcement strategies.
Legal scholars who advocate New Policing make two principal arguments.
First, they claim that enforcement of public order laws reinforces social norms
in a manner that can stabilize high-crime communities." For example, Wesley
18. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers, SkidRows, andPublic-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1177-84, 1238-46 (1996); Dan
M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REv. 349, 367-77 (1997);
Livingston, supra note 1, at 578-84; Tracey L. Meares, Social Organization and Drug Law
Enforcement, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 191, 219-27 (1998); Waldeck, supra note 5, at 1299-1308. This
point is often made by referring to the impact that disorder can have on norms of law-abidingness.
Professor Kahan, for example, has written: "Norms of order are critical to keeping social influence
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Skogan, one of the principal academic advocates of order maintenance, has
amassed considerable empirical evidence suggesting, that high levels of
disorder erode the willingness of community residents to work to stabilize
troubled neighborhoods, encourage out-migration by those law-abiding
residents who can afford to do so, and stimulate the commission of crimes.
19
Moreover, Professor Livingston has observed that disorder has particular
significance when the police are seen as indifferent to it. When the police do
not suppress visible disorder in distressed neighborhoods, the frequently
impoverished and powerless residents of those areas
are then the losers: for though the street harassment and threatening behavior in
many poor neighborhoods may not be deemed serious by law enforcement officials,
they are "not perceived to be minor by the victims in the community" and they
contribute "to a generalized fear that alters the social fabric of a neighborhood.
'20
Second, advocates of order-maintenance and problem-oriented policing
argue that because these tactics involve proactive efforts to prevent crime
through the prosecution of relatively minor offenses, they impose far less
draconian sanctions than conventional law enforcement tactics. And the New
Policing's emphasis on prevention as opposed to investigation and punishment
has particular appeal in the wake of September 11, since the need for
prophylactic law enforcement has been made particularly clear by the nature of
the terrorist threat. Obviously, it is unacceptable to wait until terrorist crimes
occur and then prosecute the wrongdoers; the efficacy of criminal sanctions as
a deterrent is particularly doubtful when the offenders are willing to commit
suicide in the course of their offenses. Prophylactic measures must be taken to
prevent this type of crime ex ante, rather than relying on a reactive strategy that
endeavors to punish wrongdoers ex post.
22
Perhaps the leading critic of order-maintenance policing among legal
scholars is Professor Harcourt. He attributes the success of order-maintenance
policing not to any strengthening of social norms, but rather to the harsh regime
of surveillance and control that it imposes, by authorizing police intervention
pointed away from, rather than toward, criminality; the spectacle of open gang activity, vandalism,
aggressive panhandling, and other forms of disorder transmit signals that cause both law-breakers and
law-abiders to behave in ways conducive to crime." Kahan, supra at 391 (footnote omitted).
19. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF DECAY IN
AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 65-84 (1990); see also Ralph B. Taylor, The Incivilities Thesis: Theory,
Measurement, and Policy, in MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE POLICING
RESEARCH INSTITUTE MEETING 65, 72-74 (Robert H. Langworthy ed., 1999) [hereinafter MEASURING
WHAT MATrERS].
20. Livingston, supra note 1, at 581 (quoting Gary W. Sykes, The Functional Nature of Police
Reform: The "Myth " of Controlling the Police, 2 JUST. Q. 51, 62 (1985)).
21. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 18, at 381-88; Meares, supra note 18, at 198-226; Rosenthal, supra
note 13, at 142-48; William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1795, 1836-38
(1998).
22. See generally, e.g., John Deutsch & Jeffrey H. Smith, Smarter Intelligence, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Jan. 1, 2002, at 64.
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even when conduct is at most ambiguous.23 Moreover, the widespread and
aggressive use of public order laws, he contends, stigmatizes those who are
labeled disorderly, and may for that reason undermine efforts to reinforce social
norms in troubled neighborhoods and may promote discrimination or brutality
against those who are labeled as "disorderly." 24 Professors Cole and Roberts
have added that public order laws, by permitting the police to make
enforcement decisions on the basis of highly ambiguous conduct, enable
officers to act on the basis of their own prejudices, and thus facilitate
discrimination against minorities.2 5 Critics have argued, for example, that New
York City's program of aggressive order-maintenance policing is responsible
26for a substantial escalation in the rate of police abuse of minorities.
Critics also argue more generally that aggressive policing inevitably
compromises the rights of minorities. They contend that police officers all too
frequently equate black or brown skin with criminality, and hence will unfairly
target minorities whenever they are encouraged to make enforcement decisions
based on something short of an overt breach of the peace.27 In fact, there is
considerable research suggesting that police officers tend to perceive minority
youth as more hostile and threatening than similarly situated non-minorities,
and take enforcement action on that basis. 28 And police officers inclined to
view minorities with suspicion have ample discretion to act on that view under
the authority that the Supreme Court has given them to search and seize
individuals on "reasonable suspicion," a standard that even the Court
acknowledges permits search and seizure based on highly ambiguous conduct
frequently consistent with innocence. 29 Indeed, there has been much scholarly
criticism of the "reasonable suspicion" standard precisely because it readily
23. See HARCOURT, supra note 14, at 98-104; Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A
Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, The Broken Windows Theory, and Order-
Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 308-42 (1998).
24. See HARCOURT, supra note 14, at 166-79; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, After the "Social
Meaning Turn ": Implications for Research Design and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal
Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 179, 200-02 (2000); Harcourt, supra note 23, at 368-84.
25. See Cole, supra note 14, at 1089-92; Roberts, supra note 14, at 799-818; see also HARCOURT,
supra note 14, at 171-75.
26. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 14, at 813-15. There is some statistical evidence, for example,
suggesting that New York City's aggressive program of "street stops" has unfairly targeted minorities.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder
in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 477-83 (2000).
27. See, e.g., DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 16-62 (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 136-67 (1997);
KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK
PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS 33-46 (1998); Angela J.
Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997); David A. Harris, The Stories,
the Statistics, and the Law: Why "'Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265 (1999); Randall
S. Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327 (1994).
28. For a helpful review of the pertinent research, see John Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson, Criminal
Inequality in America: Patterns and Consequences, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 24-28 (John Hagan &
Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995).
29. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125-26 (2000).
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permits the police to act on what may be racist assumptions even when
enforcing otherwise uncontroversial laws, such as traffic regulations.
30
Professor Massaro has added that because order-maintenance policing is
justified in light of its supposed efficacy, it relies on a premise deeply
subversive of constitutional norms: a belief that it is more important to stop
crime than to hew to the Constitution. She characterizes the argument for order-
maintenance policing as based on the view that the affected communities "are
willing to pay whatever price-in terms of wrongful arrests and curtailment of
liberty-that the new, get-tough regime may entail, but they would prefer, in a
better world, that the constitutional process norms, including their most
expansive formulations, were preserved.",3 1 This observation, if anything, has
even greater resonance since the September 11 attacks, as the nation ponders
whether to compromise ordinarily cherished civil liberties in order to combat a
profound terrorist threat.
The leading attempt to formulate an answer to the critique of New Policing
has been made by Professors Kahan and Meares. They observe that minorities
exercise effective political power in most major urban areas and frequently
support order-maintenance policing because "[g]iving the police the authority
to control low-level disorder is perceived as essential to deterring more serious
crimes.' 32 Moreover, the coercive effects of order-maintenance policing "pale[]
in comparison to the destructive impact of the mass incarceration of young
African-American men that has been the centerpiece of American criminal-law
enforcement since the 1980's., 33 And because the minority community itself
participates fully in the urban political process and shares in the burden
imposed by the New Policing, there is no reason to distrust the balance between
order and liberty that local political institutions strike when setting law
enforcement policy. Professors Kahan and Meares acknowledge that even
within the minority community, only a small fraction of residents-primarily
youth-will be likely to experience the curtailment of liberty associated with
order-maintenance policing, but they argue that this fact should not render
order-maintenance policing suspect, because "[i]nner-city teens and even gang
30. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994); David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical
Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 975 (1998); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
1271 (1998); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. REv. 956 (1999).
31. Toni Massaro, The Gang's Not Here, 2 GREEN BAG 2d 25, 32 (1998); see also Carol L. Steiker,
More Wrong Than Rights, in URGENT TIMES: POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER CITY COMMUNITIES 49,
50-51 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999).
32. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J.
1153, 1163 (1998).
33. Id. at 1165 (footnote omitted).
34. See id. at 1172-82.
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members are linked to the majority by strong social and familial ties."35 This
"pervasive sense of 'linked fate' between the majority of inner-city residents
and the youths affected by curfews and gang-loitering ordinances furnishes a
compelling reason not to second-guess the community's determination that
such measures enhance rather than detract from liberty in their communities.
36
This position has been challenged at every turn. Critics argue that despite
the relative empowerment of urban minorities in recent years, racism still plays
an important role in urban politics and policing;37 that even within inner-city
communities where majorities may support order-maintenance policing,
aggressive policing tactics adversely affect only a small fraction of residents,
such as young African-American males;38 that Professors Kahan and Meares'
effort to solve this problem through the concept of "linked fate" among all
members of the inner-city minority community rests on an assertion supported
by little if any empirical evidence; 39 and that the minority community actually
has deep misgivings about aggressive policing and in any event lacks any
reliable political mechanisms to set policing policy for itself.4° Finally, an
approach that trusts the political process to strike the balance between liberty
and order is of little use in evaluating law enforcement tactics targeted against
groups who are unlikely to be fairly represented in the political process, such as
counterterrorist tactics directed disproportionately at non-citizens.
If nothing else, this critique makes plain that Professors Kahan and Meares'
position ultimately rests on a variety of empirical questions about urban politics
that are difficult to answer satisfactorily. My own experience lends limited
support to the "linked fate" hypothesis; I have found that inner-city residents
tend to express great fear of crime, especially gang crime, but generally tend to
discount the possibility that their own children or friends are involved in it. Nor
is it an easy thing to determine what level of support any particular law
enforcement policy has within the minority community or elsewhere; as
Professor Massaro observes, policy preferences, especially when it comes to
35. Id. at 1175.
36. Id. at 1176 (footnote omitted). Mark Rosen has taken a similar position, arguing that non-
uniform policing tactics are appropriate when they are applied in discrete communities facing special
law enforcement problems, when "the policies at issue were shaped by experts familiar with the
communities' needs," and there is "a communal understanding" of what conduct has been proscribed,
unless "authorities had abusively deployed the legal edict in question or were likely to do so in the
future." Mark D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographic Variations of Constitutional
Requirements in the Aid of Community, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1129, 1180-81 (1999).
37. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures or Bedrock
Rights? A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215, 221-25; Cole, supra
note 14, at 1080-82.
38. See, e.g., Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 241-42; Cole, supra note 14, at 1082-88.
39. E.g., Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 243; Cole, supra note 14, at 1088.
40. See, e.g., Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and
Perceptions of Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 1219, 1262-70 (2000); Cole,
supra note 14, at 1088; Roberts, supra note 14, at 822-33.
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law enforcement, are frequently the result of tradeoffs that the public would
rather not have to make. That is likely to be especially true of the minority
community's views on urban policing; the available polling data shows, for
example, that African-Americans are more concerned about both crime and
police misconduct than non-minorities. 41 And the suggestion that judicial
deference to law enforcement policymakers should turn on the level of political
support that policing policy enjoys in the minority community is open to
serious question; the judiciary's competence to engage in such an assessment is
42hardly self-evident. But regardless of how any of these disputes are settled,
Professors Kahan and Meares' approach will have little appeal for those
unpersuaded by political process-oriented theories of constitutional law.43
Certainly, many will share Professors Alschuler and Schulhofer's view that
"[o]ur Constitution does not permit a majority to limit individual rights simply




Thus, to date, order-maintenance policing has been defended largely in
terms of political process theory, which is itself a far from unassailable
approach to constitutional law. Even more important, an implicit premise of
both advocates and critics has been that order-maintenance policing imposes a
burden on the affected communities that, if not subject to appropriate
safeguards, is constitutionally suspect. The disagreement between the two sides
of the debate is over whether the Constitution envisions political or judicial
checks on such burdens. I mean to offer a different way to think about these
constitutional questions. From the standpoint of the Constitution, aggressive
policing may be a necessity, not merely a burden which, if not appropriately
shared by the affected community, should be viewed as constitutionally
suspect.
II. THE RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION AGAINST LAWBREAKERS
The Supreme Court typically describes the Equal Protection Clause as if it
41. Compare BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS: 2000, at 109 tbl.2.16, 116 tbl.2.25, 119 tbls.2.29 & 2.30, 124 tbl.2.35 (2001)
[hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK] (showing greater concern among African-Americans that police do not
treat all races fairly and stop individuals who are innocent), with id at 125 tbl.2.37, 126 tbl.2.39, 127-28
tbl.2.41, 134-35 tbl.2.52 (showing greater concern among African-Americans about crime).
42. The question of institutional competence is a particularly serious problem for Professor Rosen's
approach, which requires courts to address nuanced policy questions. See supra note 36. For a detailed
and rich account of the difficulties in determining whether aggressive inner-city law enforcement can
fairly be said to further the ability of inner-city communities to control their own destiny, see Richard C.
Schragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REv. 371, 416-59 (2001).
43. For what likely is the leading critique of a political process-oriented view of the Constitution,
see Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE
L.J. 1063 (1980). This view has been effectively deployed against Professors Meares and Kahan's
position. See Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 239-40; Erik G. Luna, The Models of Criminal
Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 389, 451-54 (1999).
44. Alschuler & Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 240.
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were an all-purpose antidiscrimination statute, forbidding all arbitrary or
unwarranted differences in the manner in which the government treats
individuals or groups.45 I hope to demonstrate that this characterization is at
best incomplete. The guarantee of equal protection is not only a constraint on
the manner in which the government imposes obligations or distributes its
largesse; it also contains an affirmative command with respect to the manner in
which the government protects people from crime. I begin with an account of
the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it provides a useful reminder
that the concept of equal protection was not intended solely to grant a new civil
right for the individual against the government; that Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause was in large part an effort to guarantee that the criminal law
would be vigorously and effectively enforced.
A. Protection Against Lawbreakers and the Original Meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause
The conventional account of the origin and purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment goes something like this: The guarantees now contained in Section
One of the Amendment, as well as the congressional enforcement power in
Section Five, were a response to concerns that the nation's first civil rights law,
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, might have exceeded Congress's constitutional
authority, as well as a concern that a future Congress might repeal the Act.4 6
Indeed, when the Fourteenth Amendment was before Congress, many of its
proponents explained that the Amendment was needed to ensure the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act as well as to protect the rights it
secured from future Congresses.
47
The conventional account unquestionably explains a great deal of what
motivated the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, but by stressing the
importance of protecting individual civil rights, it obscures at least part of the
core purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. At the outset, viewing the
Fourteenth Amendment as an effort to codify the Civil Rights Act of 1866
overlooks important differences between the two.48 The Civil Rights Act of
45. See, e.g., Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam); Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997); City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439
(1985).
46. See, e.g., CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 2-5 (1981); HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
19-40, 55-57 (Peter Smith 1965) (1908); HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE:
EQUALITY AND JUSTICE DEFERRED-THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 56-57 (Madison
Books 2000) (1973); Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?,
2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949).
47. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2498 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Broomall); id. at
2462 (Rep. Garfield); id at 2459 (Rep. Stevens); id. at 2465 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 2511 (Rep. Eliot); id.
at 2896 (Sen. Doolittle).
48. It also overlooks the fact that the first proposal for a Fourteenth Amendment actually predated
the introduction of the Civil Rights Act. On December 6, 1865, Representative Bingham introduced a
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1866 reads like a conventional antidiscrimination statute intended to secure the
rights of individuals. For example, section 1 of the 1866 Act provided:
[A]ll persons born in the United States... are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
wherof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory of the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
49
This formulation-identifying particular criteria, such as race, that may not
be used when making certain kinds of decisions-is repeated in many modem
antidiscrimination laws.50  During Reconstruction, Congress used this
formulation repeatedly; it appeared, for example, in critical provisions of the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 and the Civil Rights Act of 1875.51 Indeed, during
Reconstruction, Congress utilized this formulation in the Constitution itself; the
Fifteenth Amendment contains similar phraseology. 52  The Fourteenth
Amendment, however, employs a different phraseology: "No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 53 The Equal Protection Clause is
not limited to securing equality with respect to particular civil rights granted
individuals under the law; the criminal laws afford "protection" as well. Indeed,
the most obvious type of "protection" that the government provides under the
law is the protection against lawbreakers offered by the criminal justice system.
Yet in legal scholarship there has been surprisingly little effort to consider the
relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment's use of the term "protection"
and the law enforcement function.
54
proposed constitutional amendment granting Congress authority to "make all laws necessary and proper
to secure to all person in every State equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property." CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865). Senator Lyman Trumbull did not introduce the Civil Rights Act
until January 5, 1866. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866).
49. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000)).
50. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 3604 (2000).
51. See Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 235; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
52. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1.
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
54. Although the history of the Fourteenth Amendment has been extensively studied by legal
scholars, there has been little effort to consider the significance of that history for the law enforcement
function. The only scholarly effort of which I am aware was made by Steven Heyman, although his
concerns are considerably different than mine. Professor Heyman has advanced the view that the
concept of "protection" includes protection against private violence, but his concern is not with "equal
protection" at all; rather, he has argued that the Constitution contains a substantive right of protection
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It was Representative John Bingham of Ohio who was responsible for
inserting the concept of "equal protection" into the Constitution. Bingham, with
some difficulty, convinced the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, which
drafted the Fourteenth Amendment, to substitute the eventual text of the Equal
Protection Clause for Representative Thaddeus Stevens's original proposal.55
Stevens's language, like that of the Civil Rights Act, was phrased in
conventional antidiscrimination terms: "No discrimination shall be made by
any State, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 56 The most obvious difference
between Bingham's and Stevens's formulations, of course, is that Bingham's
makes no explicit mention of race. But that cannot be the sole significance of
the difference between the competing formulations; if the only objective were
to frame the amendment in race-neutral terms, the drafters could have simply
lopped off everything in the Stevens draft after the word "persons." 57 Stevens's
language also limited the amendment to "civil" rights; Bingham's language was
not limited in this respect.58 And the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses employ significantly different formulations. The
former applies only when the state itself deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property, but the latter's reference to state action is not so direct; the Equal
Protection Clause does not require that the state itself deprive a "person" of
anything; it more generally applies to any "denial" of "the equal protection of
the laws."
Stevens evidently believed that Bingham's formulation embodied a general
antidiscrimination principle similar to his own proposal.59 But Bingham
claimed that his proposal had a somewhat different point; he asserted that the
concept of equal protection merely codified what was already in the
that he employs to quarrel with the Supreme' Court's holding that the Fourteenth Amendment contains
no right to governmental protection from private violence in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of
Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 557-71 (1991).
55. See JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., S. DOC. No.
711, 63d Cong., 3d Sess. 28-44 (1915).
56. Id. at 28.
57. While the Joint Committee recorded its votes, it did not record the substance of its discussions;
to determine the Committee's thinking on this issue requires a good deal of speculation. Much of the
scholarly speculation about the committee's thinking revolves around the race-neutral character of
Bingham's proposal. See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869, at 79-92 (1990); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL
PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 48-58 (1998).
58. Moreover, as Alexander Bickel first observed, the use of a race-neutral and quite general
formulation suggests at a minimum that the framers of the Equal Protection Clause may have been
hoping to constitutionalize a general principle rather than the precise formulation found in the Civil
Rights Act. Alexander Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 60-63 (1955).
59. "This amendment.. allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that
the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2459 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Stevens).
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Constitution. When placing the Fourteenth Amendment before the House of
Representatives, Bingham argued: "No State ever had the right.., to deny to
any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or
immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many of them have
assumed and exercised the power, and that without remedy., 60 That remark is
important in two respects. It suggests not only that Bingham believed that the
antebellum constitution already recognized the rights that the Equal Protection
Clause secured, but also that the states were routinely violating these
constitutional rights. And that leads to the context in which Bingham spoke.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, violence against the newly freed slaves as
well as Union sympathizers became widespread in the South. 61 The source of
that violence was not only the southern governments themselves; private acts of
terrorism against the newly freed slaves were also common:
Besides militia units and county patrols, irregular bands of marauders and
desperados preyed on blacks. Such attacks were often unprovoked and against
inoffensive individuals. Mounted outlaws and "regulators" rode about the
countryside whipping, hanging, and murdering blacks, immune to capture by local
authorities or federal soldiers. Driving freedmen from their homes and threatening
witnesses with swift retribution, they perpetrated such punishments as lashing their
victims on their bare backs with cowhide whips. In Pitt County, North Carolina, a
group of former Confederate soldiers met a black man on the road, castrated him,
and later killed him. A ruffian in Edgefield, South Carolina, claimed to have cut
eight ears off eight Negroes and he carried the lobes in an envelope to display to
friends and acquaintances. 
62
State and local officials provided no effective redress against this epidemic
of violence:
Justice appeared to be blind to crimes by whites against blacks. Courts seldom
heard complaints involving white assaults on blacks because officials helped white
defendants escape prosecution. Local authorities did little to apprehend roving
bands of whites who killed freedmen, and in many communities the murder of a
black person was not considered a serious crime. If arrests were made, white mobs
released the guilty parties, and in the rare case of a conviction of a white man for an
assault on or murder of a freedman, the punishment was usually minimal or
ludicrous. John Bate of Mariana, Florida, guilty of vicious attacks on a black
woman, was sentenced only to pay court costs and a fine of five cents. The
combination of public apathy, uneven justice, and inefficient or prejudiced officials
made prosecuting whites for crimes against blacks almost impossible. General
Philip Sheridan summed up the situation: "My own opinion is that the trial of a
60. Id. at 2542. Bingham made a similar point in defense of his original draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In response to claims that the proposed amendment would radically alter the rights of
states, Bingham claimed that no state had ever had a "right to deny protection to any free citizen of the
United States within their limits in the rights of life, liberty, and property." Id. at 1090; see also id. at
1088.
61. E.g., ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
119-23 (1988); JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION: AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 51-53 (1961);
KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 75 (1965).
62. GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS No PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF
RECONSTRUCTION 28 (1984) (footnote omitted).
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white man for the murder of a freedman in Texas would be a farce."
6 3
Reports of violence and oppression of the newly freed slaves and Union
sympathizers became widespread in the Northern press, and provoked public
demands for a response.64 In the face of that demand, on December 13, 1865,
the newly assembled Thirty-Ninth Congress created the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction (of which Bingham was a member), charged with investigating
conditions in the southern states and determining whether these states were
entitled to representation in Congress. 65 In the following months, the Joint
Committee heard extensive testimony on conditions in the South, providing
vivid documentation of the extent of the violence against newly freed slaves
and Union sympathizers. 66 Jacobus tenBroek summarized the proceedings
thusly: "Witness after witness spoke of beatings and woundings, burnings and
killings, as well as deprivations of property and earnings and interference with
family relations-and the impossibility of redress or protection except through
the United States Army and the Freedmen's Bureau." 67 John Hope Franklin
called the testimony "a dreary recital of inhumanity." 68 This testimony
produced considerable congressional doubt that "the Southern states could be
trusted to manage their own affairs without federal oversight. 6 9
In its report recommending the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Joint Committee found that there were in the South "acts of cruelty, oppression,
and murder, which the local authorities are at no pains to prevent or punish. 7 °
Absent federal protection, "the colored people would not be permitted to labor
at fair prices, and could hardly live in safety." 7 1 Thus, the need for federal
"protection" became clear to the committee, and the public at large. 72 And the
63. Id. at 21 (footnote omitted),
64. See FONER, supra note 61, at 224-27; FRANKLIN, supra note 61, at 55-56; JOSEPH B. JAMES,
THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 51-52 (1956); NELSON, supra note 57, at 42-44;
STAMPP, supra note 61, at 73-81. The northern public was particularly excited by the report of Carl
Schurz, who had toured the South at the request of President Johnson, and found violence against the
freed slaves and Northern sympathizers to be widespread. See FRANKLIN, supra note 61, at 55; STAMPP,
supra note 61, at 73-74; see also SEN. EXEC. Doc. NO. 2, 39th CONG., MESSAGE OF THE PRES. OF THE
UNITED STATES 14, 17, 19-20, 77-78 (1865).
65. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 30, 46-47 (1865).
66. The volume of testimony of this type found in the appendices to the Joint Committee's report is
enormous. For testimony of newly freed slaves, see REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. No. 30-39, pt. 2, at 50-60 (1866). For an example of one of the reports of the
United States Army regarding conditions in the South, see id. pt. 3, at 41-48.
67. JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW 203-04 (Collier Books 1965) (1951) (footnote
omitted).
68. FRANKLIN, supra note 61, at 58.
69. FONER, supra note 61, at 246.
70. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, H.R. Rep. No. 39-30, at xvii (1866).
71. Id.
72. Indeed, in its first encounter with the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court described
Congress's desire to combat lawlessness in the South as one of the Amendment's principal objectives.
See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 70 (1873); see also Dist. of Columbia v. Carter, 409
U.S. 418, 426 (1973) (noting that unwillingness of Southern states to enforce their own laws against
those violating the civil rights of others was the principal motive of § 1 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of
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problem, of course, was not confined to laws expressly discriminating against
the newly freed slaves. As the preceding discussion should make clear, in the
wake of the Civil War, even the most basic facially neutral laws that purported
to protect everyone-such as homicide laws-were frequently not enforced
when the victims were African-Americans. The need to secure protection
against widespread violence in the South was thus a central part of the original
understanding of the concept of "equal protection."
The original understanding of "equal protection" also had particular
significance with respect to the government's obligation to protect the populace
from lawbreakers. The notion that the government is under a constitutional
obligation to protect the citizenry from lawbreakers may seem novel today, but
at the time that the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted, that concept was
anything but radical; indeed, it was widely thought that the antebellum
constitution had itself secured such a right.73 Nineteenth century legal thinkers
believed that one of the basic obligations that the government owed its people
was to protect their persons and property, a consequence of the social contract
theory that was widely thought to be implicit in the antebellum constitution.
74
Indeed, a government's obligation of protection was frequently invoked in the
Thirty-Ninth Congress.75 In particular, it was widely believed that Article IV of
the antebellum constitution afforded all citizens of the United States a right to
protection from lawbreakers through its Privileges and Immunities Clause.76 In
his famous opinion discussing the privileges and immunities protected under
Article IV in Corfield v. Coryell,77 Justice Washington had described the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as embodying the concept that all "citizens of
free governments" held certain "fundamental" rights, one of which was the
1871); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175 (1961) (same).
73. It would have been particularly important to Bingham and the other drafters to be able to link
their proposal to settled constitutional arrangements, since the principal objection to Bingham's original
and unsuccessful proposed Fourteenth Amendment was that it would have granted Congress a radical
new power to prescribe what rights persons would enjoy to life, liberty and property under state law. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1063-64 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Hale); id at 1083-87 (Rep.
Davis); id. at 1095 (Rep. Conkling).
74. See, e.g., John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J.
1385, 1435-36 (1992); Heyman, supra note 54, at 512-45; Earl M. Maltz, The Concept of Equal
Protection of the Laws: A Historical Inquiry, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 499, 507-10 (1985).
75. For example, in supporting the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Luke P. Poland
argued: "All the people, or all the members of a state or community, are equally entitled to protection."
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2962 (1866). Senator Benjamin F. Wade characterized the purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause as to provide "protection of person and property to all persons .... Id.
at 2769. These are but two of numerous statements to the same effect. See, e.g., id at 342 (remarks of
Sen. Cowan); id. at 570 (Sen. Morrill); id. at 1152 (Rep. Thayer); id. at 1263 (Rep. Broomall); id. at
1293-94 (Rep. Shellabarger); id. at 1757 (Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1832 (Rep. Lawrence); id. at 2799 (Sen.
Stewart); id at 2918 (Sen. Willey). See generally Alfred Avins, The Equal "Protection" of the Laws:
The Original Understanding, 12 N.Y.L. F. 385 (1966).
76. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
77. 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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right to "protection by the government." 78 The framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment were well aware of this discussion in Corfield; indeed, Senator
Jacob Howard, a member of the Joint Committee, quoted it when presenting the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate on behalf of the Committee.79 Although
Bingham did not himself invoke Corfield explicitly in the floor debates, when
arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment merely enabled Congress to enforce
longstanding constitutional rights, he claimed that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV recognized an entitlement "to be protected in
life, liberty, and property."
80
Moreover, as Jacobus tenBroek demonstrated long ago, the phrase "equal
protection" had deep origins in abolitionist rhetoric, referring to the
"protection" that all persons-including slaves and free African-Americans-
were entitled to receive from the law against private violence. Abolitionists
argued that because slaves were denied any legal protection against their
masters or other white citizens, they were denied "equal protection" in a
manner inconsistent with both the Due Process and Privileges and Immunities
Clauses of the antebellum constitution. 81  Bingham himself, while
acknowledging that slaves could not be considered citizens under the
antebellum constitution, advanced this position prior to the war to defend the
rights of free blacks under the Constitution.8 2 With the ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment having eliminated any constitutional basis for treating
slaves differently from other persons,83 the obligation of states to provide
78. See id. at 551-52.
79. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). The sponsors of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 also relied on this discussion in Corfield when defending the constitutionality of that legislation.
See, e.g., id. at 474-75 (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at 1117-18 (remarks of Rep. Wilson).
80. See id at 2542; see also id. at 1088. See generally HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M.
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 406-07 (1982).
This point becomes somewhat more complicated since Bingham, during the debate on his original
proposal, also made references to the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause as securing a right to
equal protection. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 1090, 1292 (1866). Yet in the same debate, he
also acknowledged that the Supreme Court had held that the Bill of Rights was inapplicable to the states.
See id. at 1089-91. The most likely explanation for this apparent muddle is that Bingham thought that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause made the Fifth Amendment applicable to the states, and that the
Fourteenth Amendment would provide a vehicle for enforcement of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of
due process not available under existing law. See, e.g., MALTZ, supra note 57, at 114-15.
81. See TENBROEK, supra note 67, at 51-55, 66-93, 117-20; see also JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 62-64, 77 (1983); MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS
42-56 (1986). See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73-102 (1970); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 20-30 (1994).
82. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981-85 (1859); see also Richard L. Aynes, The
Antislavery and Abolitionist Background of John A. Bingham, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 881 (1988); Trisha
Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 48 ARK. L. REV. 347 (1995).
83. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
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"equal protection" would have appeared to Bingham and other abolitionists to
84follow a fortiori. In any event, the critical point for present purposes is that
the concept of "equal protection" was not limited to protection from
discriminatory state laws-achieving equal protection against lawbreakers was
at the core of the Clause's objectives. This idea would not have seemed radical
to the Clause's authors, but rather a codification of what was widely regarded
as already within the Constitution.
The understanding of the Equal Protection Clause expressed by the
Congress as it enforced the Fourteenth Amendment in the immediate wake of
its ratification reinforces the view that a principal purpose of the Clause was to
secure equal governmental protection against private lawbreakers. The primary
congressional response to continued lawlessness in the postwar South was the
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which afforded civil and criminal remedies against
both governmental and private action that deprived individuals of civil rights.
85
The supporters of this legislation repeatedly argued that the southern states'
failure to protect African-Americans and Union sympathizers in their midst
from crime violated the Equal Protection Clause.86 Representative James A.
Garfield, for example, made plain that malicious or inept enforcement of even
facially non-discriminatory laws violated the Equal Protection Clause:
[T]he chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but that even
where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic
maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a
portion of the people are denied equal protection under them. Whenever such a state
of facts is clearly made out, I believe that the last clause of the first section [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] empowers Congress to step in and provide for doing
justice to those persons who are thus denied equal protection.
Similarly, Senator John Pool argued:
Rights conferred by laws are worthless unless the laws be executed. The right to
personal liberty or personal security can be protected only by execution of the laws
upon those who violate such rights. A failure to punish the offender is not only to
deny the person injured the protection of the laws, but to deprive him, in effect, of
the rights themselves.
8 8
84. Indeed, this was the view on which the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was enacted. Its principal
sponsors defended the constitutionality of the bill by arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment's
ratification had entitled the newly freed slaves to all rights of citizens, relying in significant part on
Corfield. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474-75 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull); id. at
1117-18 (Rep. Wilson).
85. See 17 Stat. 13, ch. 22 (1871) (repealed in part, otherwise codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1985-86 (2000)).
86. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 69, 71 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Shellabarger); id. at 332, 334 (Rep. Hoar); id. at 339 (Rep. Kelley); id. at 334-36 (Rep. Lowe); id. at 428
(Rep. Beatty); id. at 448 (Rep. Butler); id. at 459 (Rep. Coburn); id. at 481-84 (Rep. Wilson); id. at 501
(Sen. Frelinghuysen); id. at 506 (Sen. Pratt); id. at 696-97 (Sen. Edmunds); id. at App. 251 (Sen.
Morton). The Supreme Court recently made this same point. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598, 624-25 (2000).
87. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 153 (1871).
88. Id. at 608. There were also references to the southern states' failure to effectively enforce the
law in the statements made in support of the Civil Rights Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140, ch. 114
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And, as the Supreme Court observed in Briscoe v. LaHue8 9 as it held that
witnesses are immune from liability for damages under the civil remedy found
in the 1871 Act,90 its legislative history reflects considerable congressional
concern not with unjust or discriminatory prosecutions and convictions, but
with unjust acquittals of those accused of crimes against African-Americans
and Union sympathizers. 91 In short, while we have become used to thinking of
the concept of equal protection as a right of the individual against the state, its
original meaning had much more to do with guaranteeing that law enforcement
would be equally effective against all threats to public peace and safety.
92
B. Protection Against Lawbreakers and the Contemporary Understanding of
the Equal Protection Clause.
I myself find originalism a far less determinate and disciplined method of
constitutional interpretation than do its advocates, since debates about the
original meaning of constitutional provisions so frequently devolve into
unsatisfying disputes over what weight should be afforded to the various bits of
frequently conflicting evidence about the original understanding of the
constitutional text. 93 In the context considered here, for example, one can fairly
(1870). E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 1956 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Edmunds); id. at 2718-
20 (remarks of Sen. Pool).
89. 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
90. That civil remedy is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
91. 460 U.S. at 337-41. The Court observed:
The bill's proponents were exclusively concerned with perjury resulting in unjust acquittals-
perjury likely to be committed by private parties acting in furtherance of a conspiracy-and
not with perjury committed "under color of law" that might lead to unjust convictions. In
hundreds of pages of debate there is no reference to the type of alleged constitutional
deprivation at issue in this case: perjury by a government official leading to an unjust
conviction. Indeed, the legislative history is virtually silent even with regard to perjury by
private persons leading to convictions of innocent defendants. There is a simple enough reason
for this lacuna: the Klan had other, more direct, means of dealing with its victims.
Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
92. Indeed, the abundant evidence that providing protection against lawbreakers was one of the
objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment has enabled some to argue that the Supreme Court erred by
limiting that Amendment's scope to state action. See, e.g., Alan R. Madry, Private Accountability and
the Fourteenth Amendment: State Action, Federalism and Congress, 59 MO. L. REV. 499 (1994). The
position advanced here, however, is considerably narrower. As Professor Currie has argued, even if the
state action requirement was correctly read into the Fourteenth Amendment, a state's own failure to
provide its residents with equal protection against lawbreakers plainly was within the scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment's intended objectives. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 397-98 (1985).
93. Indeed, some have even argued, relying on the Reconstruction Congress's understanding of the
character of the obligation of "protection," that the Equal Protection Clause was not intended to confer
any general protection against discriminatory state legislation, but instead only promises equal
protection against threats to the security of their persons or property. E.g., RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 198-220 (2d
ed. 1997); Avins, supra note 75, at 425-29. There are, however, plenty of statements in the floor debates
suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment provides general protection against discriminatory
legislation. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2539 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth); id. at
2549 (Rep. Stevens); id at 2765-66 (Sen. Howard). Moreover, some scholars have argued that the
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debate how much weight to give Bingham's view that the Fourteenth
Amendment merely enabled Congress to enforce preexisting constitutional
rights against the states. After all, in critical respects Bingham's view of the
antebellum constitution was obviously not shared by the majority of his
colleagues, who enacted the Civil Rights Act over his objection.94 And even
putting aside the many difficulties in reliably ascertaining the original meaning
of this or any other constitutional provision, there are, of course, powerful
arguments that the Constitution should not be chained to a static conception of
its original meaning or intent. 95 None of this, however, should mean that the
historical context in which the Fourteenth Amendment was written and ratified
should be without significance, even for those who reject original meaning as a
satisfactory method of constitutional interpretation. The historical context of
the Fourteenth Amendment should at least provoke inquiry into the
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to the manner in which otherwise
neutral laws are enforced.9 6 And that leads to consideration of the constitutional
text itself.
The conventional view of the Equal Protection Clause as primarily directed
at discriminatory state legislation makes little effort to account for the use of
the word "protection," and for that reason deserves to be viewed with some
skepticism. As Professor Currie has noted, "'protection of the laws' is, after all,
evidence suggesting that the Equal Protection Clause was not intended to be a general prohibition
against discrimination suggests that the broader statements of some of the framers indicating that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited many forms of governmental discrimination were directed to the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause, which, they argue, provides more
comprehensive protection against state discrimination than is commonly understood. See, e.g., CURRIE,
supra note 92, at 342-51; Harrison, supra note 74, at 1414-51. The weight to be given this conflicting
evidence, as Bret Boyce has persuasively argued, ultimately depends on what proof is required before
the original meaning of a constitutional provision is considered established, a question for which there is
no entirely satisfactory answer. See Brett Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 909 (1998).
94. Indeed, a number of powerful attacks have been launched against the soundness of Bingham's
constitutional reasoning. See, e.g., BERGER, supra note 93, at 198-220; Fairman, supra note 46, at 25-37,
51-54. But see, e.g., Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,
103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993). And at least when it came to the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act,
which Bingham opposed as beyond congressional power, see, e.g., FLACK, supra note 46, at 30-32; see
also CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1 st Sess. 1290-94 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Bingham), Bingham turned
out to be wrong. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437-44 (1968).
95. For a recent and quite powerful summary of the case against originalism that can be made along
these lines, see RCHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13-25 (2001).
96. Indeed, I have engaged in an examination of the original intent behind the Equal Protection
Clause not because I mean to suggest that a constitutional provision's original meaning is the only
legitimate way to construe its scope, but instead in regard of Justice Holmes's aphorism that "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic." New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). An
evaluation of the scope of the Equal Protection Clause is surely aided by consideration of its origins,
even if that inquiry is not dispositive for any number of reasons. For example, Professor Perry ascribes
significance to the desire of the Fourteenth Amendment's framers to end discrimination in law
enforcement, and he is not one to confine the Constitution to the original understanding of its text. See
MICHAEL J. PERRY, WE THE PEOPLE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 54-57,
82-87 (1999).
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a peculiar way to express a general freedom from discrimination." 97 Professor
Harrison has similarly noted, "the word protection is not doing much work in
the standard reading of the text. Nothing is gained by going from 'equal laws'
to 'the equal protection of the laws.' If orthodoxy is correct, the noun in the
Equal Protection Clause is, at best, surplusage." 98 That noun, moreover, seems
to have plain application to the manner in which the government provides
protection against lawbreakers.
Under the Equal Protection Clause, accordingly, the government is
obligated to provide effectively equal protection against all threats to public
peace and safety. Indeed, "protection" is the substantive value identified by the
Clause that must be "equal"; government has an affirmative obligation to
ensure that the security it provides against the threat of private lawbreaking is
"equal." 99 Thus, protection against lawbreakers is a type of governmental
service of special constitutional significance. On this view, it would even be
appropriate to characterize the right to protection against lawbreakers as
"fundamental"; it is expressly protected by the Constitution, and under the case
law, when a right that enjoys express or implicit constitutional protection is at
issue, strict judicial scrutiny is ordinarily required.100
To the extent that judicial precedents are on point, they support this
understanding of equal protection. If, for example, municipal policymakers
decided to deploy their police department primarily in wealthy neighborhoods,
in order to please their most influential constituents, while leaving
disadvantaged, predominantly minority neighborhoods to the predations of
gang and drug dealers, applicable precedent readily suggests that there would
be an equal protection violation. This is the implication of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,10l in which the Court reversed a conviction under a facially non-
discriminatory municipal ordinance requiring laundries to be licensed, but
which had been applied only against Chinese businesses. 102 Yick Wo has come
to stand for the proposition that judicial relief will issue under the Equal
Protection Clause when a litigant "demonstrate[s] that the administration of a
criminal law is 'directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons...
97. CURRIE, supra note 92, at 349.
98. Harrison, supra note 74, at 1434.
99. Linking the Equal Protection Clause to the entitlement to receive protection against lawbreakers
accordingly answers Professor Westen's charge that the Equal Protection Clause is essentially
meaningless because it does not identify any external standard against which equality must be measured.
See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1982). On the view advanced
here, the "protection" that the government provides against lawbreakers is the substantive benefit that
must be distributed equally.
100. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124-28 (1996); Attorney General of New York v.
Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904-06 (1986); Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 183-85 (1979); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 262-63 (1974).
101. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
102. See id. at 374.
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with a mind so unequal and oppressive' that the system of prosecution amounts
to 'a practical denial' of equal protection of the law." 10 3 Indeed, the case law
does not limit the guarantee of equal protection to racial or ethnic
discrimination; the Supreme Court has construed the Equal Protection Clause to
forbid the unwarranted denial of government services to even a single
individual. 104 It should follow that when the government fails to provide
meaningful police protection for an identifiable class or individual, while
protecting others far more effectively, that is a denial of the right to equal
protection.
0 5
C. Equal Protection Against Lawbreakers as a Judicially Underenforced
Norm
One could well ask why, if my account of the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause is persuasive, there are no precedents announcing this right to
"equal protection" from the predations of criminals that I have argued is to be
found in the constitutional text, its history, and related precedents. The answer,
I suggest, is that this aspect of equal protection is a paradigmatic example of a
judicially underenforced norm.
As Professor Sager has taught us, for a variety of prudential and
institutional reasons, courts frequently "fail[] to enforce a provision of the
Constitution to its full conceptual boundaries.' 0 6 In particular, the Supreme
Court's willingness to recognize and enforce the commands of the Constitution
"may be truncated for reasons which are based not upon analysis of the
constitutional concept but upon various concerns of the Court about its
institutional role."'0 7 Indeed, Professor Sager has identified the reluctance of
courts to enforce the Equal Protection Clause absent explicit racial or similarly
''suspect" classifications as "[a] prominent example of this
phenomenon ....,108 Nevertheless, Professor Sager reminds us that
103. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (quoting Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373).
See also DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 n.3 (1989).
104. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam).
105. The Supreme Court came close to acknowledging this point in United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598 (2000). While holding that the Violence Against Women Act was not a proper exercise of
congressional remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court acknowledged
that a state's failure to provide effectively equal protection to a class of its residents would violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, and found the Act invalid only because it provided no remedy against state
officials that had failed to discharge their own constitutional obligations. See id at 624-26.
106. Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (1978).
107. Id. at 1214.
108. Id. at 1215. He identified some of the prudential concerns underlying judicial hesitancy to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause to its full conceptual limits: "In the most general of terms, the
claims for restraint typically turn on the propriety of unelected federal judges' displacing the judgments
of elected state officials, or upon the competence of federal courts to prescribe workable standards of
state conduct and devise measures to enforce them." Id. at 1217 (footnotes omitted).
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"constitutional norms which are underenforced by the federal judiciary should
be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits, and federal
judicial decisions which stop short of these limits should be understood as
delineating only the boundaries of the federal courts' role in enforcing the
norm."'
109
The affirmative conception of equal protection advanced here is almost
certain to be judicially underenforced. Consider what would happen if a
minority resident of a high-crime neighborhood-even one who had been the
victim of a crime-brought suit alleging that the failure of the local authorities
to offer police protection as efficacious as that enjoyed by upper-income,
predominantly non-minority neighborhoods violated the Equal Protection
Clause. A court would likely reject the claim, but for reasons having little to do
with its merits. If the plaintiff sought injunctive relief requiring the police to
provide improved service in the plaintiffs high-crime neighborhood, a court
would likely rule that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek such relief, reasoning
that the possibility that the plaintiff would be victimized by a criminal act in the
future was too speculative to permit a claim for injunctive relief to proceed. 1 0
Whatever "chilling effect" that the plaintiff felt from fear of crime would be
considered too subjective to permit the case to proceed."' The court would
probably add that it is entirely speculative whether whatever injunctive relief
the court might issue would in fact reduce crime, and for that reason the
plaintiff's injury would not be considered fairly redressable by judicial
decision. 112 The court could bolster its ruling by reference to federalism and
separation of powers principles, noting that courts should ordinarily not
supervise policing tactics or other inherently executive functions."13 If,
conversely, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries incurred as a result of the
crime of which the plaintiff had been a victim, the court would most probably
rule that the legal or "proximate" cause of those damages was the criminal act
109. Id. at 1221. This thesis enjoys wide support among legal scholars. See, e.g., FALLON, supra
note 95, at 31-34; Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 1524, 1594-96 (2000); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 866-69 (1999); Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties,
Revisited, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1642-44 (1999); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Sigel, Equal Protection
by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 10 YALE L.J. 441, 467-73
(2000); Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 321-24
(1987).
110. See generally, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105-10 (1983); Ashcroft v.
Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (1977) (per curiam); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1976); O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496-99 (1974).
111. See generally, e.g., Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375-77; O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496-97; Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972).
112. See generally, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568-71 (1992); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757-59 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40-
46 (1976); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618-19 (1973).
113. See generally, e.g.,Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-61; Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377-80; Gilligan v. Morgan,
413 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1973); Laird, 408 U.S. at 14-16.
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of a third party, not the law enforcement policies of the government. 114 If the
court reached the merits, it would likely apply a highly deferential rule-as
long as the policing policies of the defendant government were not expressly
based on a suspect criterion such as the race, they would withstand
constitutional attack if they have a conceivable rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest."15 Yet, even this seemingly substantive rule of
constitutional law reflects the institutional and prudential constraints on the
judiciary; the Supreme Court has acknowledged that it adopted this deferential
"rational basis" test for facially neutral laws because of its concern that a more
demanding approach would jeopardize an unacceptably large number of
legislative judgments. 116 In the law enforcement context in particular, courts are
particularly eager to defer to the judgments of policymakers having what they
view as greater expertise on how to best protect the public.' 1 7 Indeed, in the
handful of cases to consider claims that the police have failed to provide the
plaintiff with effectively equal protection against lawbreakers, courts have
uniformly rejected such claims, stressing the limited scope of judicial review
and the importance of judicial deference in this area." 8 For just this reason,
even if a court were willing to conclude that the right to equal protection
against lawbreakers was fundamental, it would question whether courts can
fashion a remedy that will ensure that protection is truly equal; in an unjustly
neglected portion of the decision in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez," 9 the Court made the important point that even when it confronts a
right that it considers fundamental, when it cannot be sure whether the remedy
that a plaintiff seeks will actually allocate that right equally, it should stay its
hand. 120
114. See generally, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980). See also Brower v. Inyo
County, 489 U.S. 593, 599 (1989).
115. See, e.g., Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273-79 (1979);
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
116. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247.
117. See generally, e.g., Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377-80; Laird, 408 U.S. at 14-16. This point is of
particular significance. As I will explain in some detail below, determining how best to provide equal
protection against lawbreakers is laden with policy judgments largely beyond judicial expertise, and for
this reason the constitutional norm at issue is one that inevitably will be judicially underenforced.
118. See, e.g., Hilton v. City of Wheeling, 209 F.3d 1005, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1080 (2001); Harvey v. City of Conroe, 148 F. Supp. 2d 783, 787-89 (S.D. Tex. 2000);
Pariseau v. City of Brockton, 135 F. Supp. 2d 257, 263-64 (D. Mass. 2001); Walker v. Shepard, 107 F.
Supp. 2d 183,186-89 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).
119. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
120. In that case, the Court confronted a claim that the Equal Protection Clause requires equalizing
expenditures on education between school districts. The Court reasoned that even if there were a
fundamental right to equal educational opportunity triggering strict judicial scrutiny, because it is
difficult for a court to assess the relationship between expenditures and educational opportunities, the
Court could not reliably determine whether equalizing expenditures would equalize educational
opportunities as well. See id at 40-44. Rodriguez accordingly illustrates a critical point for present
purposes-there are some values that the judicial process may not be able to reliably allocate in an equal
fashion, even if the Constitution considers them fundamental.
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In short, to reject a claim of the type that I have argued the Equal Protection
Clause supports would invoke a host of reasons that have little to do with the
conceptual reach of the Equal Protection Clause, but which are instead based
on a variety of institutional concerns.' 21 Perhaps on an unusually powerful
showing that the police have failed to provide adequate protection to a discrete
community or from a discrete threat a court might be persuaded to provide a
remedy on the theory advanced here, but in general, institutional concerns
would counsel strongly toward deference even if a court were persuaded that
the Equal Protection Clause contains an affirmative guarantee of equally
effective protection from lawbreakers. And, as Professor Sager has taught us,
that kind of ruling does not mean that the constitutional principles at stake do
not exist; it only means that for institutional reasons, the courts will not enforce
them. 1
22
121. The closest that the federal courts have come to recognizing this type of equal protection claim
is a line of cases leaving open the possibility that if a victim of domestic violence could establish that the
police treat domestic violence allegations less seriously than other offenses because of an intent to
discriminate against women, such proof would support an equal protection claim. See Shipp v.
McMahon, 234 F.3d 907, 913-14 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1052 (2001); Hayden v.
Grayson, 134 F.3d 449, 453 (lst Cir. 1998); Soto v. Flores, 103 F.3d 1056, 1066 (1st Cir. 1997);
Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995); Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir.
1994); Ricketts v. City of Columbia, 36 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 1994); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990); Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1031 (3d Cir.
1988); Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988); see also Amy Eppler, Note, Battered
Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help When the Police Won 't?, 95 YALE
L.J. 788 (1986). These claims at least have a fighting chance because classifications involving sex
invoke heightened judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). But
this line of cases illustrates the many difficulties in pursuing such claims. First, courts caution that proof
that a challenged law enforcement policy disproportionately disadvantages female victims of crime is
insufficient to show discriminatory intent. See Shipp, 234 F.3d at 913; Hayden, 134 F.3d at 453; Soto,
103 F.3d at 1067; Navarro, 72 F.3d at 716; Eagleston, 41 F.3d at 878; Ricketts, 36 F.3d at 781. Second,
the cases also caution that something more than speculation is required to prove proximate causation;
specific evidence is required that the crime would not have occurred had a different enforcement policy
been utilized. See id. at 779-80. Third, when an intent to discriminate against women cannot be proven,
as long as the enforcement decisions at issue were rational, they will be upheld, at least absent a showing
of animus against the victim. See Shipp, 234 F.3d at 916-17; Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179
F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1998).
122. It bears acknowledging that in some of its recent cases restricting the scope of congressional
remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has characterized the
rational basis test as a substantive rule of equal protection jurisprudence rather than a product of the
institutional constraints on judicial authority. I refer particularly to Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001), holding that the prohibition on employment discrimination on the basis of disability in
the Americans with Disabilities Act was not within the scope of congressional authority under Section 5,
and Kimel v. Florida Board of Education, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), holding the same for the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. Unlike other recent cases finding challenged legislation beyond the
scope of congressional authority under Section 5 when Congress, in the Court's view, had failed to
identify a sufficient pattern of constitutional violations prior to enacting assertedly remedial legislation,
see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640-48 (1999);
City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-35 (1997), Garrett and Kimel do more than require a greater
factual predicate for remedial legislation; they characterize the rational basis test used to judge claims of
disability and age discrimination as a substantive rule of constitutional law that Congress is not free to
disregard when exercising its remedial powers. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365-68; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-
85. Of course, the propriety of the Court's approach in these cases is far from self-evident. See, e.g.,
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 383-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 189-92 (1997). But even
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Accordingly, like most other judicially underenforced norms, the obligation
to provide equal protection from lawbreakers depends primarily on the political
branches of government to give it meaning and substance.' 23 There is,
moreover, good reason to believe that the political process will be cognizant of
this norm. For one thing, voters consider crime to be an issue of considerable
importance. 24 Protection against lawbreakers therefore is something that the
political process is likely to endeavor to provide. And as for "equal" protection,
voters tend not to think of police protection as a type of political pork that
officeholders should be able to dole out to favored constituents. Instead, a norm
of equal protection in policing is deeply rooted. In fact, conventional policing
strategies, as I will now endeavor to demonstrate, were developed in an effort
to conform to this norm; they stress uniformity and reactivity in an effort to
provide all communities what appears to be an "equal" level of police service. I
will also argue, however, that it has become increasingly evident that uniform
and reactive policing is a seriously deficient means to achieve the norm of
equal protection from lawbreakers.
III. CONVENTIONAL POLICING AND EQUAL PROTECTION
The idea that law enforcement strategy is driven by a constitutional norm
if the Court's approach in these cases is thought to undermine Professor Sager's view that the rational
basis test reflects institutional constraints on the judiciary rather than the conceptual reach of equal
protection, that should not undermine the power of his insight for cases in which facially neutral law
enforcement practices fail to provide victims with effectively equal protection. The approach taken in
Garrett and Kimel appears to rest at least in part on the Court's view that the type of discrimination at
issue in those cases was justifiable at least in terms of cost or efficiency; the Court appears to believe
that employers have legitimate reasons to take the age and disabilities of employees or applicants into
account. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367-68 (governmental employers "could quite hardheadedly-and
perhaps hardheartedly-hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the
disabled"); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 ("[A] State may rely on age as a proxy for other qualities, abilities, or
characteristics that are relevant to the State's legitimate interests."). At the same time, the Court has
been careful to acknowledge the existence of congressional power to proscribe facially neutral practices
with discriminatory results, see, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373-74; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525-26,
and in the case most analogous to the context considered here, the Court acknowledged that if states
failed to provide effective protection against private violence to a class of their residents, Congress
would have authority to fashion a remedy against the offending state officials under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 624-26 (2000).
123. The notion that a core objective of the Equal Protection Clause was left largely to the political
branches for its enforcement should not be surprising. As the account of the origin of the Equal
Protection Clause advanced above should make plain, its framers were primarily concerned about
securing congressional authority to combat conditions in a particular portion of the country. Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, of course, accomplishes just that, by granting Congress "power to enforce
[this Amendment] by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Moreover, as the
discussion above reflects, those who crafted the Clause were primarily concerned with securing
congressional authority to address abuses found only in a particular region. Thus, I quite agree with
Professor Strauss's characterization of the Fourteenth Amendment as an "outlier" amendment--one
designed to address practices that have come to be considered outside of the constitutional mainstream.
See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1457 (2001).
And in that sense, the political process would have been thought capable of enforcing this constitutional
norm.
124. See, e.g., 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 41, at 101 tbls.2.2 & 2.3.
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rather than the more mundane political considerations that usually bear on local
government decisionmaking is not as radical as it may seem at first blush.
There is actually widespread agreement that law enforcement is not a perquisite
to be doled out to politically favored constituents, but instead should be
provided "equally." What I hope to demonstrate below, however, is that in
terms of this norm of "equal protection," conventional policing strategies are
frequently deficient.
A. The Emergence of the Conventional Policing Model
In the middle of the nineteenth century, urban police forces gradually
emerged, acquiring from local sheriffs and constables the primary
responsibility for law enforcement in most large cities. 125 The spoils system
being a central feature of local politics, most positions on the newly created
police forces were awarded on the basis of patronage and other political
considerations. 126 But patronage was not the only attraction that policing had
for politicians. As Robert Fogelson has demonstrated, the rapidly rising
immigrant populations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
brought with them values that were often quite different from those reflected in
the frequently puritanical American legal codes. By controlling law
enforcement, politicians could exploit the increasing clash of cultures between
traditional elites and newer immigrant populations, currying favor with one
side or another:
[T]hose who controlled the police had the opportunity to implement a policy about
vice consistent with the prevailing life-style and underlying morality of their
constituents. As the moral and cultural conflict between the natives and the ethnics
intensified, many politicians found this opportunity a heavy burden, but not one that
they dared turn over to anyone else.
12 7
This system created ample opportunities for corruption, not only among
politicians willing to overlook unlawful activities, but among the police as well.
Officers generally walked a beat, and because supervisors lacked radios or
other means of establishing a reliable command-and-control system, officers on
patrol exercised enormous discretion. 128 In this environment, brutality and
125. See generally, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM: THE
EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONALISM 4-7 (1977).
126. See, e.g., ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 13-31 (1977); WALKER, supra note 125, at
8-12; George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, From Political to Reform to Community: The Evolving
Strategy of Police, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 8-9 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D.
Mastrofski eds., 1988); Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Police Organization in the Twentieth Century, in MODERN
POLICING 67-70 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1992) [hereinafter MODERN POLICING].
127. FOGELSON, supra note 126, at 21. Fogelson adds that many of the vice laws enacted during the
so-called Progressive Era around the turn of the century can be viewed as an effort by traditional elites
to regulate what they perceived as dangerous signs of disorder and cultural conflict among immigrant
populations. See id at 20-21.
128. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 125, at 13-14; Reiss, supra note 126, at 59-61.
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corruption flourished. 129 This state of affairs, however, eventually produced a
backlash-a powerful reform movement that, in fits and starts, transformed the
character of urban policing, creating a new model of policing that we now take
for granted as the "conventional" approach to policing strategy.'
30
The reform movement had two central objectives. The first was to remove
patronage from policing by creating civil service systems in which police
would be hired and promoted using "merit-based" procedures-often
administered by commissions insulated from political influence.1 31 The second
was an emphasis on centralized command and control. Patrol officers were
assigned to conduct motorized patrol throughout an assigned beat, responding
speedily to orders from centralized dispatchers directing them to the scene of a
reported crime or breach of the peace, with detectives and other specialized
personnel later assigned to engage in retrospective investigation of offenses
when necessary. 132 In this way, the reform movement fought the evils of
discretionary justice in a classic way-it sought to bureaucratize policing by
creating an effective hierarchy that was able to control a large workforce by
routinizing organizational behavior.
33
In an era in which political machines controlled virtually every aspect of
urban governance, the success of the reform movement was remarkable: "In all
but a handful of cities, [the reformers] weakened the position of the ward
leaders, undermined the influence of the precinct captains, severed the
connections between them, and thereby destroyed the territorial basis of
decentralization that had heretofore been an integral feature of the American
police."'134 Indeed, as George Kelling and Mark Moore have observed:
So persuasive was the argument of reformers to remove political influences from
policing that police departments became one of the most autonomous public
organizations in urban government. Under such circumstances, policing a city
became a legal and technical matter to be left to the discretion of professional police
executives, under guidance of law. Political influence of every kind came to be seen
as a failure of police leadership and as corruption in policing.'
35
The success of the reformers' policing model reflects the power and appeal
of what I have called the norm of equal protection against lawbreakers. While
129. See, e.g., FOGELSON, supra note 126, at 22-35, 148-49; WALKER, supra note 125, at 15-18,
25-26; Kelling & Moore, supra note 126, at 8-9; Reiss, supra note 126, at 79-82.
130. See, e.g., FOGELSON, supra note 126, at 41-53; WALKER, supra note 125, at 56-68; Reiss,
supra note 126, at 70-7 1.
131. See, e.g., FOGELSON, supra note 126, at 58-60; WALKER, supra note 125, at 39, 74, 168;
Reiss, supra note 126, at 57, 70-72.
132. See, e.g., GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS:
RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 13-14 (1996); WALKER, supra note
125, at 128, 136-37; Kelling & Moore, supra note 126, at 13-14; Mark Harrison Moore, Problem-
Solving and Community Policing, in MODERN POLICING, supra note 126, at 108-11; Reiss, supra note
126, at 58-61.
133. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6-7; Reiss, supra note 126, at 57-58, 70-72.
134. FOGELSON, supra note 126, at 226.
135. Kelling & Moore, supra note 126, at 11 (citation omitted).
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the reform movement did not frame its argument in explicitly constitutional
terms, in effect the reformers' argument was that the law enforcement function
was subject to the same equality principle that I have suggested can be found in
the Fourteenth Amendment-the law must be enforced equally, impartially,
and apolitically, without distinction between those who are favored by the local
authorities and those who are not. As Robert Fogelson put it: "The reformers
were uncompromising. To arguments that vice should be confined to certain
neighborhoods and regulated by the police they responded that it should be
eliminated forthwith everywhere in the city."'136 The reformers denied that
politicians had anything relevant to contribute to law enforcement precisely
because protection was a legal rather than a political entitlement; to them, "the
police force was ... an administrative rather than a legislative body; the
preservation of order, the protection of property, and enforcement of law were
not policy issues."
'1 37
At first blush, the reform policing model seems to comport quite nicely
with the norm of equal protection against lawbreakers. There are two respects
in which the public expects police protection, reflecting ex ante and ex post
perspectives on the policing function: the public expects the police to deploy
and patrol in a fashion that will prevent crime; and it expects prompt police
response to, and effective investigation of, crimes once they have been
committed. The reform model endeavored to provide equal protection from
both perspectives: Uniform and motorized patrol deterred crime by signaling
potential lawbreakers that the police might appear at any place or time, and
central command and control ensured that police responded quickly and on an
impartial basis to calls for service. But the ability of the conventional policing
model adopted in the wake of the reform movement to provide effectively
equal protection deserves greater scrutiny, especially from the ex ante
perspective.
B. The Non- Uniform Character of Crime
It was Clifford Shaw who first demonstrated that crime is in large part a
function of geography. Analyzing Chicago crime data in the first decades of the
twentieth century, he showed that crime rates were much higher in certain
neighborhoods than others, and that these neighborhood crime rates are
remarkably stable over time. 138 In the intervening decades, it has come to be
well understood that crime tends to cluster in discrete geographic areas and is
136. FOGELSON, supra note 126, at 41.
137. Id. at 49.
138. See CLIFFORD R. SHAW ET AL., DELINQUENCY AREAS: A STUDY OF THE GEOGRAPHIC
DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOL TRUANTS 198-206 (1929). For a useful discussion of the import of the
findings of Shaw and his colleagues, see ROBERT J. BURSIK & HAROLD G. GRASMICK,
NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE DIMENSIONS OF EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY CONTROL 29-45 (1993).
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relatively stable within those areas.' 39 There are a variety of likely explanations
for this phenomenon. Empirical evidence, for example, consistently
demonstrates that crime rates, especially for violent crime, are particularly high
in areas of concentrated poverty. 140 That, in turn, means that crime frequently
clusters geographically, since urban poverty is generally highly concentrated in
discrete and usually racially segregated neighborhoods. 14 1 Moreover, it has
become a fairly widespread view among urban sociologists that communities
experiencing concentrated poverty suffer from an isolation effect, in which the
absence of middle-class role models promotes a culture that rejects middle-
class values, including norms of law-abidingness. 142 Urban sociologists also
frequently argue that communities experiencing concentrated poverty tend to
lack mechanisms of social control-social arrangements by which norms of
law-abidingness are inculcated and enforced. 143 Sampson, Roudenbush and
Earls have used the concept of "collective efficacy" to make this point; in a
particularly influential paper, they demonstrated that rates of violent crime in
communities are highly related to indicia of collective efficacy-community
residents' sense that the community as a whole effectively endeavors to prevent
crime.14 4 But whatever the explanation for the relationship between community
139. See, e.g., John E. Eck, Preventing Crime at Places, in PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS,
WHAT DOESN'T, WHAT'S PROMISING: A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 7-1 (Lawrence W.
Sherman et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter PREVENTING CRIME]; William Spelman, Criminal Careers of
Public Places, in CRIME AND PLACE 115-44 (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds., 1995) [hereinafter
CRIME AND PLACE].
140. For useful surveys of the research on the relationship of poverty, family instability, and crime,
see ELLIOTT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 120-47 (1998), and GARY LAFREE, LOSING
LEGITIMACY: STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 117-34 (1998).
141. See, e.g., PAUL JARGOWSKY, POVERTY AND PLACE: GHETTOS, BARRIOS, AND THE AMERICAN
CITY 59-88 (1997); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 115-47 (1993). A number of studies vividly demonstrate the
relationship between highly concentrated poverty and neighborhood rates of violent crime. See, e.g.,
JAMES F. SHORT, JR., POVERTY, ETHNICITY, AND VIOLENT CRIME 50-54 (1997); Kenneth C. Land et al.,
Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Any Invariances Across Time and Social Space?,
95 AM. J. SOC. 922 (1990); Douglas S. Massey, Getting Away With Murder: Segregation and Violent
Crime in America, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1995).
142. See, e.g., SHORT, supra note 141, at 55-74; WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 7-9, 46-62 (1987); Lauren
J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods and Urban Crime, 75 SOC.
FORCES 619 (1997); Edward S. Shihadeh & Nicole Flynn, Segregation and Crime: The Effect of Black
Social Isolation on the Rates of Black Urban Violence, 74 SOC. FORCES 1325 (1996).
143. See, e.g., BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 138, at 15-18, 34-35; JOHN HAGAN, CRIME AND
DISREPUTE 67-99 (1994); DAN A. LEWIS & GRETA SALEM, FEAR OF CRIME: INCIVILITY AND THE
PRODUCTION OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM 11-22 (1986); Francis T. Cullen, Social Support as an Organizing
Concept for Criminology: Presidential Address to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, 11 JUST.
Q. 527 (1994). The most prominent dissenters from this view are Gottfredson and Hirschi, who
generally attribute crime to low self-control, while acknowledging that certain demographic groups
experience higher crime rates, a phenomenon that they speculate may relate to child-rearing practices.
MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME 154-59 (1990). This
view is accordingly consistent with the theory that poverty is the principal social component of crime,
given the adverse effects of poverty on child rearing. See sources cited supra note 140.
144. See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Roudenbush, & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods and Violent
Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997); see also Robert J. Sampson,
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and crime, there is no doubt that it exists; research consistently discloses much
higher crime rates in communities that display various indicia of instability.
145
Indeed, this fact largely explains the seeming relationship between race and
crime-racial minorities are more likely to live in areas of concentrated poverty
and instability.
146
Of particular note is the fact that persons who commit crimes are not only
disproportionately likely to live in disadvantaged neighborhoods, but also are
likely to commit their crimes in those neighborhoods. At least for
economically-motivated crimes, one might think that the crime rates should be
highest in relatively affluent neighborhoods, where presumably the most
lucrative targets can be found. Yet that is not the case, even for property
crime. 147 Rates of violent victimization in particular are far higher among the
poor; between 1993 and 2001, the rate of victimization for violent crimes
among persons with a household income of less that $7,500 was consistently
more than twice as high as the rate among those with a household income in
excess of $75,000. 148 Studies examining the relationship between violent
victimization and neighborhood instability are harder to come by, but the
available evidence suggests that poverty alone does not predict rates of violent
crime in an area as well as a more comprehensive set of indicia of community
instability, such as high population density and resident mobility, low levels of
family stability, and a lack of strong community organizations. 149 Krivo and
Peterson, for example, using data from Columbus, Ohio, found that rates of
property crime were somewhat higher, and rates of violent crime were
dramatically higher, in communities that experienced greater indicia of
community instability. 1
50
The geographic "lumpiness" of crime, however, is not solely a function of
community. Even within what are considered high-crime communities, crime
tends to cluster in discrete places. 151 This phenomenon is explained by the
Jeffrey D. Morenoff & Felton Earls, Beyond Social Capital: Spatial Dynamics of Collective Efficacy for
Children, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 633 (1999).
145. The literature is helpfully reviewed in Ronald C. Kramer, Poverty, Inequality, and Youth
Violence, 567 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 123 (2000).
146. See, e.g., Janet L. Lauritsen & Robert J. Sampson, Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in
THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 58, 65-70 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
147. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 2001, CHANGES 2000-01 WITH TRENDS 1993-2001,
at 5-7 (2002).
148. See id at 15, App. tbl.1.
149. See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Violent Victimization and Offending:
Individual, Situational and Community-Level Factors, in 3 UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
VIOLENCE 43-64 (Albert J. Reiss & Jeffrey A. Roth eds., 1994); Sampson, Roudenbush & Earls, supra
note 144, at 921-23.
150. See Krivo & Peterson, supra note 142, at 628-31.
151. See, e.g., Ralph B. Taylor, Crime and Small-Scale Places: What We Know, What We Can
Prevent, and What Else We Need To Know, in CRIME AND PLACE: PLENARY PAPERS OF THE 1997
CONFERENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESEARCH AND EVALUATION 3-9 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1998);
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"routine activities" approach to criminology, which analyzes crime the way that
other routine activities are analyzed to determine how they come to be
performed as they are. The advocates of the routine activities approach posit
that crime rates will be highest where three things intersect-motivated
offenders, desirable targets, and a lack of guardians, such as parents, friends,
neighbors, private security guards, or police, who occupy space in a manner
that deters crime. 152 The routine activities approach adds that criminals tend to
identify as desirable targets persons or locations in their own communities,
since they feel more comfortable in those environments and, as with other
routine activities, are relatively less willing to travel considerable distances for
an uncertain reward.
153
All of this should cast considerable doubt on the efficacy of conventional
policing strategy to deploy police where they are most needed. Areas at which
motivated offenders, desirable targets, and a lack of guardians intersect are not
randomly distributed; and it is those locations at which the police are most
needed to provide "guardianship" that would otherwise not be present. It
follows that when the police are deployed in random and uniform patrol, they
will frequently not be present where they can do the most good. As Ralph
Taylor has observed:
Even in a high-crime neighborhood, most blocks will have low crime rates, and
most addresses will have no reported crimes. Links between crime and community
do not provide the data on specific places needed to guide deployment of police
officers. Police hope to be more efficient and productive by focusing on high-crime
places (or hot spots), rather than on high-crime communities. Crime data and police
service calls that are "geocoded" reveal concentrations of crime in a few hot places.
Increasing patrol deployments to higher crime neighborhoods appears to produce
only modest gains in crime control. If we know exactly where and when crimes are
taking place, we should be able to control crime more effectively.
154
Indeed, the current enthusiasm for mapping crime among urban police
departments reflects the growing consensus that effective police deployment
must be directed toward deterring crime at the locations where it is most likely
to occur. 155
The empirical evidence concerning the effect of policing tactics on crime
also suggests the inadequacy of random patrol and retrospective investigation
of completed criminal offenses to help high-crime neighborhoods and the "hot
Lawrence W. Sherman et al., Hot Spots of Predatory Crime: Routine Activities and the Criminology of
Place, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 27 (1989).
152. See, e.g., BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 138, at 62-72; GOTTFREDSON & HIRSCHI, supra
note 143, at 22-44; John E. Eck & David Weisburd, Crime Places in Crime Theory, in CRIME AND
PLACE, supra note 139, at 7-18; Lawrence E. Cohen & Marcus Felson, Social Change and Crime Rate
Trends: A Routine Activities Approach, 44 AM. Soc. REv. 588 (1979).
153. See, e.g., BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 138, at 71-72; KEITH HARRIES, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MAPPING CRIME: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE 26-28 (1999).
154. Taylor, supra note 151, at 2.
155. See HARRIES, supra note 153, at 67-89.
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spots" they contain. In a particularly useful summary of recent research,
Lawrence Sherman found no evidence that increasing random patrols or
reactive arrests, or reducing response time to calls for emergency service,
reduced crime rates. 56 Similarly, Eck and McGuire's review of some twenty-
seven recent studies showed no effect on crime of increasing the number of
police officers.1 57 In fact, among criminologists, something of a consensus has
developed that increasing the number of officers on patrol does not reduce
crime. 158 Given the relationship between place and crime, this result is not
surprising; deploying police randomly makes no effort to place officers where
they are most needed. Patrol targeted to crime "hot spots," in contrast, better
reflects the differential needs of different communities and places for police
protection. This conclusion is increasingly supported by impressive evidence
suggesting that directed patrol targeting high-crime "hot spots" produces
significant reductions in crime rates.
159
Of course, if police resources were disproportionately targeted at crime "hot
spots," one might expect criminals simply to move to other, less intensively
patrolled locations. The available evidence, however, suggests that crime is not
geographically fungible in this sense; the great majority of studies have found
that the displacement effects that follow geographically targeted policing are
limited. Routine activities analysis helps explain this result. There are only a
limited number of locations where offenders and targets intersect, and when
those locations are well-policed, offenders will be reluctant to move to other
locations less conducive to offending. And even when displacement occurs, it
imposes costs on offenders. As John Eck has observed, illicit markets, such as
markets in drugs and prostitution, can maximize revenues only if they are
widely accessible, and this requires establishing geographically stable
marketplaces where buyers can confidently expect to find willing sellers. 161 If
police pressure forces these markets to continually relocate, their profitability
156. See Lawrence W. Sherman, Policing For Crime Prevention, in PREVENTING CRIME, supra
note 139, at 8-8 to 8-13, 8-16 to 8-20.
157. See Eck & McGuire, supra note 5, at 209-17.
158. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 12-13; Moore, supra note 132, at 111-12.
159. See Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century,
in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 29-33 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998); Sherman, supra note
156, at 8-13 to 8-15; Anthony A. Braga, The Effects of Hot Spot Policing on Crime, 578 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 113-19 (2001).
160. See, e.g., Eck, supra note 139, at 7-40 to 7-41; Eck & Weisburd, supra note 152, at 19-20;
Renee B.P. Hesseling, Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature, in 3 CRIME PREVENTION
STUDIES 197-230 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1994); Braga, supra note 159, at 120.
161. See John E. Eck, A General Model of the Geography of Illicit Retail Marketplaces, in CRIME
AND PLACE, supra note 139, at 67-93. This helps to explain, for example, the popularity of outdoor drug
markets, which at first blush seem irrational since they should be more vulnerable to detection by the
police. For data on the prevalence of outdoor drug sales, see, for example, K. JACK RILEY, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, CRACK, POWDER COCAINE AND HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND USE PATTERNS IN SIX U.S.
CITIES 16-17 (1997); BRUCE G. TAYLOR ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, ADAM PRELIMINARY 2000
FINDINGS ON DRUG USE AND DRUG MARKETS-ADULT MALE ARRESTEES 24-25 (2001).
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will decline.' 
62
In short, current thinking about the relationship between crime and place
suggests that the conventional model of policing is at best a grossly inefficient
means of deploying police officers where they are most needed. Of course,
evaluating empirical evidence about policing and crime is a tricky business
since so many factors affect crime rates, and their relative influence remains
poorly understood. But the importance of targeted patrol seems self-evident; as
a matter of common experience, we know that some places within cities are
more dangerous than others, and for just this reason there is little basis for
believing that deploying the police randomly and uniformly, and summoning
them to a particular location only after a crime has occurred, is likely to
maximize police effectiveness. 63 Moreover, because conventional policing is
almost entirely reactive-assigning patrol officers virtually no responsibility
for preventing crime other than driving through an assigned area on an
essentially random basis-the ability of police on random patrol to equalize the
effective protection that residents receive from lawbreakers is sharply
circumscribed. A reactive strategy-waiting for a crime to be committed and
reported before officers commence enforcement action-means that the police
do little to reduce the disparities in crime rates between communities. 164
C. The Inadequacy of Conventional Policing To Provide Equal Protection
My concern here, however, is not primarily with police efficacy, but instead
with constitutional principle. Under the norm of equal protection advanced
162. My own advocacy of anti-loitering laws as a means to disrupt patterns of drug trafficking is
based largely on this point. See Rosenthal, supra note 13, at 139-42.
163. Zimring and Hawkins have made this point in the context of drug crime:
An emphasis on high-crime zones meshes well with other priorities that should govern the
allocation of discretionary resources in drug control. High-crime areas in the city are precisely
where children and youth are most at risk of becoming involved in crime and delinquency,
where drug traffic is most demoralizing to the middle class, and where social structure is most
at risk of disorganization. Crime rates can thus serve as a proxy for a complex set of factors
that represent a concentration of the greatest costs associated with illicit drugs in modern
America. We thus regard crime-impacted areas in American cities as high-priority candidates
for any resources targeted to combat urban problems and would regard drug control funds as
no exception.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 155 (1992).
164. Mark Moore has added that because this strategy makes police enormously reliant on the
willingness of community residents to report crime, that also limits its effectiveness:
[Tlhe reactive strategy is systematically unable to deal with crimes that do not produce victims
and witnesses. This has long been obvious in trying to deal with so-called victimless crimes
such as prostitution, gambling, and drug dealing. It has recently become clear, however, that
many other crimes do not produce victims or witnesses ready to come forward. Sometimes
people have been victimized and know it but are reluctant to come forward because they are
afraid or are closely related to the offender and reluctant to see him or her arrested, or some
combination of the two. It is hard for the reactive strategy to reach systematic extortion or wife
battering or child abuse, for the victims do not give the alarm. It may even be hard to get at
robbery in housing projects where the victims and witnesses fear retaliation.
Moore, supra note 132, at 112-13 (citation omitted).
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above, uniform policing tactics-in which the police make no effort to identify
where crime is more likely to occur and allocate resources accordingly-are
enormously suspect. Those tactics create a kind of formal equality-every
neighborhood should be patrolled equally, and every call for police service
should be answered with equal speed-but in effect provide only the form, and
not the substance, of equal protection. Random patrol will systematically
disadvantage the poorest, least stable neighborhoods-those in which a police
presence is most needed to bolster inadequate non-governmental controls.'
65
And the communities most disadvantaged by this approach are likely to be
disproportionately minority-a particularly troubling outcome in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment's objective to equalize the protection that African-
Americans were to receive under the law. It should be plain from the discussion
above, moreover, that the norm of equal protection against lawbreakers is not
satisfied by the form of equal protection without the substance. If the Equal
Protection Clause identifies a substantive good-such as security against
lawbreakers-that must be provided equally, then the residents of high-crime
neighborhoods have good reason to complain that conventional policing tactics
will frequently deny them that equality.
Of course, one can argue that because the factors that produce high crime
rates in some neighborhoods and places but not others are not attributable to the
government itself, a government's failure to respond to them by shifting
policing resources and altering policing tactics is not a constitutional concern-
at least given the current understanding of the Equal Protection Clause's state
action requirement 66-regardless of whether it is wise policy. But this
objection overlooks the import of the text itself-it requires equal "protection";
and residents of high-crime neighborhoods can legitimately argue that a
policing model that works for some neighborhoods but not others fails to
provide "protection" that is "equal" in the constitutional sense. This objection
also overlooks the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. The origin of much of
the violence directed at the newly freed slaves and Union sympathizers in the
wake of the Civil War was non-governmental, and the southern states' failure
to meet it with meaningful efforts to enforce the law was the evil that gave rise
to the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, the magnitude of the southern
states' defaults far exceed the flaws of conventional policing tactics, but those
165. Indeed, Bursik and Grasmick persuasively argue that the leading flaw in most accounts of
social organization and its effect on the crime rate is that they ignore the differing ability of communities
to call upon governmental resources to supplement those in the community itself. Less stable, socially
disorganized neighborhoods are less effective in pressing their claims upon local government, and thus
are less able to obtain governmental resources that can work to increase the level of social organization
and control in a neighborhood. See BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 138, at 34-45.
166. In general, the state action requirement is thought to prohibit only governmentally sanctioned
discrimination, even if governmental policies are influenced by some forms of private discrimination
such as racially segregated residential patterns. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189
(1973).
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are differences of degree only. If the Equal Protection Clause is understood to
require more than formal equality-if law enforcement must endeavor to make
the protection equally meaningful for everyone-then government must devise
policies that acknowledge that some persons live under far greater threats than
others, and hence cannot receive effectively equal protection unless law
enforcement resources are deployed to meet those threats. 167 A policing
strategy based on uniform patrol, however, will leave some communities and
locations far more vulnerable to crime than others, and for that reason it is
unlikely to provide substantively equal protection.'
1 68
To give conventional policing its due, in at least one sense it provides much
more than formal equality. That is because conventional, reactive policing will
result in greater investment of those resources in high-crime neighborhoods that
generate a disproportionate number of calls for service and crimes requiring
investigation. That point, however, does not mean that conventional policing
approaches are likely to yield effective equality in protection from
lawbreakers-whatever the resources devoted to high-crime areas under
conventional policing models, they obviously are insufficient to equalize crime
rates. Conventional policing therefore may provide the substance of equal
protection in the ex post sense, but surely not in the ex ante. Accordingly, the
politically accountable branches of government could well conclude that the
residents of high-crime neighborhoods are entitled to a more effectively
"equal" level of security than they receive under conventional policing models.
Of course, it is difficult to treat equal protection, as that concept is
advanced here, as anything more than an aspiration-providing effectively
equal protection involves enormous practical difficulties, which helps to
explain why this is a constitutional norm that the courts cannot practicably
enforce to its conceptual limits.1 69 Moreover, I make no claim that the view of
conventional policing advanced here is the only acceptable understanding of
the constitutionality of that approach under the Equal Protection Clause. The
norm of equal protection against lawbreakers is one that has largely been left to
the political process, and the politically accountable branches of government
may reach a wide variety of conclusions about how best to provide equal
protection, any number of which might be consistent with the Constitution.
Precisely because decisions about how to achieve equal protection against
lawbreakers are rife with policy judgments, government officials might reach
167. Professor Rosen has demonstrated that geographic non-uniformity in the law is far from
uncommon in constitutional law; in fact, it is frequently employed when necessary to acknowledge the
special needs of particular communities, such as Indian reservations or military bases. See Rosen, supra
note 36, at 1138-66.
168. Professor Meares is one of the few legal scholars to focus on the significance of geographic
character of crime for law enforcement, although her approach is rather different than that found here.
See Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669 (1998).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 106-122.
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divergent views of how best to pursue this objective-even on my view of the
affirmative character of equal protection, only in unusual cases will a court be
able to offer relief to the residents of high-crime neighborhoods without
transgressing the institutional constraints on the judiciary and substituting its
own views on policing policy for those of politically accountable officials. My
point is not that courts should routinely order local officials to move beyond the
conventional policing model; it is instead that local officials could permissibly
conclude that the kind of formal equality provided by the conventional model
of policing is constitutionally unsatisfactory. If they do so, and alter policing
strategy in order to provide a more substantive form of equality in protection,
that approach would be entirely consistent with constitutional aspirations.
IV. APPLYING THE AFFIRMATIVE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
It remains to be considered how policing approaches that move beyond the
conventional model fare under the affirmative conception of equal protection.
In the discussion that follows, I consider the implications of this view of equal
protection for policing styles in general, for order-maintenance policing in
particular, and finally, for claims of discrimination in policing.
A. Policing Styles and Equal Protection
The great virtue of problem-oriented policing, in terms of the view of equal
protection advanced here, is that it acknowledges the non-uniform character of
crime, and addresses it proactively. A problem-oriented approach begins by
identifying the locations at which crime occurs, and attempts to identify
criminogenic conditions related to those locations, such as poorly run taverns,
abandoned buildings, or locations that attract unruly loiterers. 170 Then,
proactive tactics are adopted to target these conditions, such as building a case
for revocation of a liquor license, demolishing buildings that are unlikely to be
rehabilitated, or aggressively targeting loiterers for public-order law
enforcement.171 Officers are instructed to concentrate enforcement efforts on
particular areas where they are most likely to be needed. 172 This necessarily
requires police to abandon the reform-era view that they do not make policy but
instead merely respond impartially to calls for service; police must overtly
make policy in order to take a problem-oriented approach. 1
73
To provide more effective protection for high-crime neighborhoods,
however, not only must the police make policy, but they then must be
170. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32-41, 66-70.
171. See id. at45-49.
172. See id. at 132-41.
173. The empirical data to date provides grounds for optimism about problem-oriented policing, at
least when it involves adoption of a highly focused crime prevention strategy. See Sherman, supra note
156, at 8-30 to 8-34.
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aggressive when executing it. An effective policing style is about more than
patterns of deployment; passively driving along in squad cars until patrol
officers see someone foolish enough to commit an offense as a marked squad
car passes by is not likely to accomplish much, no matter how astutely police
are deployed. As Mark Moore has observed, "[p]olice on patrol cannot see
enough to intervene very often in the life of the community."'1 74 To make a real
difference, there is no avoiding the need for aggressive enforcement tactics.
175
The most important empirical work in the field to date is likely a study by
Robert Sampson and Jacqueline Cohen. Building on a prior study that had
suggested that increased police aggressiveness reduced crime, 176 Sampson and
Cohen, with data from the 171 largest cities, used as a proxy for police
aggressiveness the number of arrests per officer for disorderly conduct and
driving while intoxicated. 177 They found that aggressive policing had a
substantial inverse relationship to robbery rates. 178 A recent study of policing
tactics in New York City similarly found that there was a significant
relationship between levels of misdemeanor arrest rates in police precincts and
reductions in the rate of violent crime. 179 These results are consistent with a
number of other studies suggesting that proactive arrest policies reduce
crime. 180 There is evidence that this pattern holds for two particular types of
crime of special concern in high-crime urban neighborhoods: firearms crime'
81
and drug crime. 182 And Professor Skogan makes a case for policing disorder
not only to show an aggressive police presence, but because he believes that the
174. Moore, supra note 132, at 112.
175. Of course, problem-oriented policing is not exclusively about enforcement tactics; it also
endeavors to redesign public places and patterns of use in order to reduce the number of desirable targets
and the points at which they intersect with motivated offenders. See, e.g., Ronald V. Clarke, Situational
Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER SOCIETY: STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION
101-22 (Michael Tonry & David P. Farrington eds., 1995). Nevertheless, no one thinks that these tactics
alone can eliminate crime at places where guardianship is weak. Indeed, the empirical evidence to date
suggests that it is frequently difficult to ensure that motivated offenders and desirable targets do not
intersect. See Eck, supra note 139, at 7-41 to 7-44; Sherman, supra note 156, at 8-30 to 8-34. And the
evidence on neighborhood watch tactics as a way of improving guardianship is quite discouraging. See
id. at 8-25 to 8-27.
176. See James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 367 (1978).
177. See Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen, Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A
Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 163, 169 (1988).
178. See id. at 176-82. Sampson and Cohen employed robbery statistics because "reported robbery
offenses are highly reliable and comparable across jurisdictions." Id. at 172 (citation omitted).
179. See GEORGE L. KELLING & WILLIAM H. SOUSA, DO POLICE MATITER?: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
IMPACT OF NEW YORK CITY'S POLICE REFORMS 6-10 (Manhattan Inst. 200 1).
180. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 156, at 8-20 to 8-25.
181. See, e.g., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
PROMISING STRATEGIES To REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE 95-124 (1999); Garen Wintemute, Guns and Gun
Violence, in THE CRIME DROP, supra note 5, at 70-73, 83-85.
182. See, e.g., Eck & McGuire, supra note 5, at 238-43; Lawrence Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan,
Deterrence Effects of Police Raids on Crack Houses: A Randomized, Controlled Experiment, 12 JUST.
Q. 755 (1995); David Weisburd & Lorraine Green, Policing Drug Hot Spots: The New Jersey City Drug
Market Analysis Experiment, 12 JUST. Q. 711 (1995).
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available data suggests that disorder stimulates the commission of violent
crime.' 
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Perhaps the leading academic skeptic of the relationship between
aggressive policing and reductions in crime is Bernard Harcourt, who analyzed
Skogan's data and found that the relationship between disorder and crime
essentially disappears when neighborhood poverty, stability and race are held
constant, 184 and observed that Sampson and Cohen did not determine whether
aggressive policing reduces crime by increasing the rate at which offenders are
apprehended, or by reducing levels of disorder.' 85 Indeed, more recent work by
Sampson places into additional doubt the nature of the relationship between
disorder and crime by suggesting that disorder and crime both stem from the
characteristics of high-crime neighborhoods, especially concentrated
poverty.' 86 But while the relationship, if any, between disorder and crime may
be of importance to criminological theory, from the standpoint of policing it
hardly matters. The data unquestionably demonstrates that the presence of
disorder, whether it causes or is merely correlated with crime, provides a signal
that aggressive policing is necessary. Public order laws, in turn, increase
sanctioning power available to the police, and therefore enable them to create a
more aggressive presence on the streetscape, maximizing their deterrent effect.
For example, it should be obvious that when offenders perceive that the risk
that they will be stopped and searched has risen appreciably, they are more
likely to be deterred from carrying firearms or contraband. Enforcement of
public order or traffic laws involving low-level offenses, in turn, is the best way
to maximize this kind of deterrence, because these laws permit the police to
increase markedly the rate at which they stop and search persons found in high-
crime hot spots. Conventional, reactive policing could not hope to produce this
kind of deterrent effect, but aggressive and widespread enforcement of public
order and similar laws can.' 87 To be sure, aggressive policing may stigmatize or
alienate those who become its targets, but without it there is little reason to
believe that the police can provide effectively equal protection to high-crime
neighborhoods.1
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183. SKOGAN, supra note 19, at 9-11, 73-75.
184. See HARCOURT, supra note 14, at 59-78.
185. Seeid. at 78-80.
186. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public
Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. Soc. 603 (1999); see also
HARCOURT, supra note 14, at 80-88.
187. Indeed, even Professor Harcourt acknowledges that New York City's use of public order law
enforcement likely has reduced crime by facilitating police surveillance and control of potential
offenders. HARCOURT, supra note 14, at 98-104.
188. Interestingly, anecdotal evidence has begun to accumulate suggesting that crime rates rose
after police forces that had been employing aggressive tactics retrenched as a consequence of public
criticism. See, e.g., Jayson Blair, Police Official Blames News Coverage for Murder Increase, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 1999, at B5; Joseph H. Brown, Cops Aren't Biggest Threat to Blacks, TAMPA TRIB., July
15, 2001, at 6; Francis X. Clines, Police in Cincinnati Pull Back in Wake of Riots, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
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B. Order-Maintenance Policing and Equal Protection
Because order-maintenance is of special significance to proactive policing,
and of special concern to its critics, it merits special consideration. While the
critics of order-maintenance policing claim that it unreasonably facilitates
discrimination against minorities, on the view of equal protection advanced
here, order maintenance policing plays a special role in securing the guarantee
of equal protection-in particular, equal protection in the ex ante sense.
Policing disorder makes a special contribution toward equalizing ex ante
protection because it ameliorates one of the conditions that most directly
contributes to the disparity between many communities in the extent to which
they experience ex ante protection from lawbreakers-that is, the degree to
which those who live in disordered versus highly-ordered communities
experience fear of crime.
Even the critics of order-maintenance policing do not question the
relationship between disorder-behavior or physical conditions that signal to
law-abiding persons that there are others in the community who do not share
their norms of order' 89 -and fear of crime. Indeed, "[t]he empirical literature
provides strong evidence that the perception of high levels of disorder in a
neighborhood is associated with relatively high fear of crime ... ,,190 In fact,
disorder seems to have a greater impact on residents' fear of crime than the
crime rate itself.19 1 Visible signs of disorder on the streetscape signal to the
community the presence of a frightening instability in its midst:
[R]esidents perceiving more "clues" as to the underlying level of disorder in their
immediate environment feel more vulnerable and thus more fearful. The "clues"-
termed incivilities-may either be social, such as public drinking, drug use, fighting
and arguing; or physical, such as litter, graffiti, abandoned lots, and vacant
2001, at Al; Kevin Flynn, Rebound in City Murder Rate Puzzling New York Officials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
5, 1999, at Al. There is also some anecdotal evidence suggesting that crime rates increased after the
terrorist attacks of September 11 required urban police to devote increased resources to antiterrorism
efforts, and therefore to reduce the resources devoted to high-crime neighborhoods. See Fox Butterfield,
Killings Increase in Many Big Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2001, at Al.
189. This is the sense in which Wesley Skogan, for example, employs the concept of "disorder."
See SKOGAN, supra note 19, at 3-9.
190. BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 138, at 104; see, e.g., id at 101-04; LEWIS & SALEM, supra
note 143, at 59-77; SKOGAN, supra note 19, at 47-48, 76-77; Jeanette Covington & Ralph B. Taylor,
Fear of Crime in Urban Residential Communities: Implications of Between-and Within-Neighborhood
Sources for Current Models, 32 SoC. Q. 231 (1991); Stephanie W. Greenberg, Fear andIts Relationship
to Crime, Neighborhood Deterioration, and Informal Social Control, in THE SOCIAL ECOLOGY OF
CRIME 47-62 (James M. Byrne & Robert J. Sampson eds., 1986); Ralph B. Taylor & Margaret Hale,
Testing Alternative Models of Fear of Crime, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 151 (1986). For example,
in a recent Department of Justice survey, residents of twelve cities identified open drinking and drug
use, open drug sales and loitering as factors that they believed affected their own safety. See BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS & OFFICE OF CMTY.-ORIENTED POLICING, U.S DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 12 CITIES, 1998, at 17 & tbl. 18 (1999).
191. Lewis and Salem provide a particularly good explication of this phenomenon, observing that
since only a small fraction of the residents of any community are actual crime victims, the crime rate
itself only slightly affects perception, while highly visible disorder on the streetscape has a far more
widespread impact on community perceptions. See LEWIS & SALEM, supra note 143, at 45-51.
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buildings. These incivilities "warn" the resident that he or she is at risk of
victimization. 192
There is, moreover, an important interaction between rates of violent crime,
disorder, and fear, albeit one that is difficult to quantify. When persons residing
in neighborhoods with relatively high rates of violent crime then observe
disorder on the streetscape, this likely reinforces fear by confronting them with
visual reminders of the threat of crime.' 93 Therefore, disorder may be an even
greater stimulant of fear in high-crime neighborhoods than elsewhere.
Fear of crime, in turn, should not be dismissed as a matter of mere
perception irrelevant to sound policing strategy. When the fear of crime
induced by disorder rises, law-abiding residents become demoralized and
withdraw from public spaces, further eroding guardianship and informal
mechanisms of social control. 19 4 Skogan's study also provides particularly
powerful evidence that disorder depresses housing values and induces those
who can afford to out-migrate from communities to do so.195 And when those
who can afford to move out of troubled neighborhoods do so, and the middle
class is afraid to move in, the "isolation effect" that sociologists argue
undermines norms of law-abidingness is exacerbated. 196 Thus, whether or not it
has any direct effect on crime rates, "disorder is an instrument of
destabilization and neighborhood decline. 197 That, in turn, ultimately leads to
increased crime, given the relationship between crime and community
instability. 198 Thus, whether there is any direct relationship between disorder
and crime is largely beside the point; the impact of disorder on neighborhood
stability leaves little doubt that disorder is, at least in the long run, a powerfully
criminogenic condition.
And protection-indeed, equal protection-from this kind of threat is
192. Covington & Taylor, supra note 190, at 232.
193. Zimring and Hawkins have made the point this way:
James Q. Wilson and George Kelling argued persuasively in their "Broken Windows" article
that indications of incivility and disorder produce citizen fear and the demand for law
enforcement and social control. One reason such indications could arouse fear is that they
convey to many persons the message that they are vulnerable to more direct and more violent
predation. But will the level of fear produced by disorder and incivility be as great where rates
of lethal violence are low as they will be where those rates are high? The context in which the
broken-window argument was made was urban conditions with high rates of lethal violence.
The extent to which fear of lethal violence and fear of concentrated threats to public order feed
off each other should be a priority concern in the social psychology of crime fears.
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 14 (1997) (citation omitted). Lewis and Salem's work supports this suggestion; they found
that information suggesting that crime rates are rising becomes a more potent stimulant of fear when it is
reinforced by signs of disorder on the streetscape. LEWIS & SALEM, supra note 143, at 76.
194. See, e.g., BURSIK & GASMICK, supra note 138, at 46-51, 101-04; KELLING & COLES, supra
note 132, at 11-14; LEWIS & SALEM, supra note 143, at 62-77; SKOGAN, supra note 19, at 13, 47-50.
195. See SKOGAN, supra note 19, at 77-84.
196. See supra text accompanying note 142.
197. SKOGAN, supra note 19, at 3.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 138-144.
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surely something that community residents are entitled to demand from
politically accountable institutions. It is difficult to quarrel with Herman
Goldstein's observation that "dealing with fear and enforcing public order...
are appropriate functions for the police; from the perspective of the community,
they may be as important as the tasks the police perform in dealing with
behavior labeled criminal."' 199 Indeed, the failure of police to respond to public
disorder exacerbates fear of crime; Lewis and Salem's study, for example,
provided powerful evidence that when local government appears unresponsive
200to public disorder, law-abiding citizens experience heightened fear of crime.
Accordingly, there is considerable virtue in an order-maintenance strategy that
targets enforcement not at what are conventionally understood to be the most
"serious" offenses, but instead at the conditions most likely to stimulate fear of
crime, through enforcement of curfew, truancy, anti-loitering, public
intoxication and similar public order laws. Order-maintenance policing
combats fear of crime in the most direct possible way, by demonstrating a
visible and proactive police presence directed at those conditions that are most
likely to stimulate fear of crime. 201 Order-maintenance policing, moreover,
signals to law-abiding residents of the community that its fears are being taken
seriously by the authorities, and therefore can be an important factor in
community stabilization.202 Thus, there is ample reason to conclude that equal
protection in the ex ante sense is critical to sound policing-it is unrealistic to
think that neighborhoods can ever be stabilized when their residents perceive
them as unsafe.
Accordingly, if the police do not attack disorder, they cannot provide the
substance of equal protection in critical respects-most important, they cannot
adequately address the fear of crime, which is the type of protection that the
community itself may well value most. The result, of course, is a system in
199. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 1, at 11.
200. LEWIS & SALEM, supra note 143, at 93-109. Mark Moore has similarly observed that "police
often discover that citizens are less interested in talking about robbery and burglary than the police
expected. Instead, they seem to focus on 'quality of life' problems such as noisy kids, visible drug
dealing, graffiti, and dangerous-looking, rotted-out buildings." Moore, supra note 132, at 115 (citation
omitted).
201. That was the conclusion of one of the few studies to consider this phenomenon. See Wesley G.
Skogan, Measuring What Matters: Crime, Disorder, and Fear, in MEASURING WHAT MATTERS, supra
note 19, at 47-50.
202. Even as they questioned whether there is any direct relationship between disorder and crime,
Sampson and Roudenbush made just this point:
Although our results contradict the strong version of the broken windows thesis, they do not
imply the theoretical irrelevance of disorder. After all, our theoretical framework rests on the
notion that physical and social disorder comprise highly visible cues to which neighborhood
observers respond. According to this view, disorder may tum out to be important for
understanding migration patterns, investment by businesses, and overall neighborhood
viability. Thus, if disorder operates in a cascading fashion-encouraging people to move
(increasing residential instability) or discouraging efforts at building collective responses-it
would indirectly have an effect on crime.
Sampson & Roudenbush, supra note 186, at 637 (citations omitted).
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which people can obtain protection from both the fear and reality of crime only
by paying for it-those who can afford to do so will move to low-crime,
relatively affluent neighborhoods, invest in private security to supplement
inadequate police resources, or both.2 °3 Protection from the threat of crime
therefore becomes a commodity to be allocated by the market. In contrast, "a
fear reduction policy, like a poverty reduction strategy, attempts to redistribute
a value, in this case security." 2°4 And if the view of equal protection advanced
here is correct, then one of the implications of the Equal Protection Clause is
that government is required to equalize the distribution of security; it may not
permit "protection" to be just another commodity allocated by market forces,
even when threats to security are not of its own making. Indeed, the racial
implications of this form of unequal protection are in themselves cause for
concern-polling data shows that fear of crime is much higher among African-
American central city residents than any other demographic group.20 5 There is
also evidence that fear of crime is higher in disadvantaged neighborhoods even
when other variables are held constant. 20 6 Failing to take steps that can
ameliorate fear of crime, accordingly, will systematically disadvantage poor,
disproportionately minority communities. Adopting an order-maintenance
strategy in order to distribute more equally a constitutionally recognized
substantive good-fear from crime-is therefore consistent with constitutional
aspirations.
C. Discrimination in Policing
While I have made the case that aggressive policing promotes compliance
with the Equal Protection Clause, it is the claim that aggressive policing is
instead likely to lead to racial profiling and other discriminatory practices that
are at the heart of the case against it.2°7 The view of equal protection advanced
here, however, has significant implications for claims of discrimination in
policing. In particular, because the norm of equal protection against
lawbreakers celebrates non-uniform enforcement practices as a necessary
response to the non-uniform character of crime, discrimination claims based on
evidence that the authorities fail to enforce the law uniformly should be viewed
with considerable caution.
In particular, the view of equal protection advanced here means that the
203. See, e.g., Clifford D. Shearing, The Relation Between Public and Private Policing, in
MODERN POLICING, supra note 126, at 408-21.
204. LEWIS & SALEM, supra note 143, at 130.
205. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PERCEPTIONS OF
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME, 1995, at 2 tbl. 1 (1998).
206. Covington and Taylor found that "even when crime, victimization, and signs of disorder are
controlled, lower status neighborhoods have higher fear levels." Covington & Taylor, supra note 190, at
239-40.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 27-36.
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Supreme Court was right in concluding in United States v. Armstrong208 that a
showing that a particular racial group has been prosecuted out of proportion to
its representation in the general population does not make out a claim of
discriminatory enforcement. 209 When enforcement resources are properly
targeted at high-crime neighborhoods, this type of racial skewing may well
result.2 1° The view of equal protection advanced here suggests that proof that
law enforcement is more proactive and aggressive in some neighborhoods than
others should count for little. Aggressive and proactive policing may be far
more necessary in some neighborhoods than others, and the use of a non-
uniform policing strategy may reflect compliance with, rather than a violation
of, equal protection principles. As I have argued above, targeted policing that
endeavors to provide effectively equal protection properly focuses most heavily
on disadvantaged neighborhoods, which are disproportionately likely to have
disproportionately minority populations. It follows that proof that minorities are
searched or arrested at disproportionate rates should not in itself establish a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. To the contrary, on the view advanced
here, such evidence may establish compliance with equal protection.
For example, Professor Harris identifies what he takes to be improper racial
profiling by pointing to evidence that even when minorities are
disproportionately stopped by police, the rate at which evidence of a crime is
found during stops is generally about the same for minorities and non-
minorities. 211 But this demonstrates no more than that the police utilize equally
reliable indicia of suspicion when deciding whether to stop minorities and non-
minorities alike. Similarly, when statistics show that minorities are being
searched at higher rates than their representation among those actually charged
with street-level crime, that may not suggest that race is being used as a proxy
for criminality, but instead the use of properly targeted policing tactics. Street
stops, for example, are likely to be utilized most heavily in areas where the
carrying of guns or the outdoor sale of drugs is a particular problem, and
precisely because minorities are more likely to reside in such high-crime
neighborhoods, enforcement efforts focusing on street stops in these
communities will disproportionately target minorities. Thus, unless they take
account of neighborhood crime rates and the use of targeted policing tactics,
differential stop rates, as well as differential rates at which minorities and non-
minorities are searched without finding evidence of a crime, will prove little.
212
208. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
209. See id. at 465-68.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 138-46.
211. DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING CANNOT WORK 78-84
(2002).
212. Fagan and Davies stress statistical evidence that in New York City, minorities were stopped
and searched out of proportion to their representation among those charged with street crime, even after
adjusting for neighborhood crime rates. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 26, at 475-84; see also David
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It may well be that nothing short of the use of "testers" in a particular
neighborhood who can demonstrate that race alone is the basis for enforcement
decisions will suffice to demonstrate the existence of anything that can fairly be
called racial discrimination in law enforcement.21 3
Moreover, even when a litigant can, demonstrate that the authorities
considered a suspect's race when making an investigative or prosecutive
decision, the question remains whether that violates equal protection. The easy
case, of course, is when the authorities use race alone as the criterion by which
they decide who will be investigated or prosecuted. Settled equal protection
doctrine tells us that the Constitution ordinarily forbids government from
utilizing racial classifications, and thus when law enforcement decisionmaking
214is explicitly racial, it is usually unconstitutional.  An officer who believes that
young Latinos are likely to be trafficking narcotics may claim to be relying on
his experience, but in reality that so-called experience has caused him to utilize
a racial classification, which equal protection forbids. But not every instance in
which a police officer considers a suspect's race when deciding whether to
target or even stop that suspect can fairly be characterized as the use of a racial
classification. Although most of the leading scholars who have written in this
area simply overlook the point, sometimes race must be considered in order to
determine how an investigation should proceed.21 5 The use of a suspect's
description that includes a racial identification illustrates the point.
Consider what happens when police officers are dispatched to an address in
response to a resident's request for police assistance stating that shots have
been fired by "a young black male." When the officers arrive on the scene and
decide that the first person they will approach is a young African-American
male who is walking away from the scene-even if they observe an otherwise
similarly situated white male also walking away-are they utilizing an
impermissible racial classification? Virtually all courts and commentators seem
to agree that in such a case, the authorities are basing enforcement decisions on
the similarity between a suspect and a witness's description, rather than on
A. Harris, When Success Breeds Attack: The Coming Backlash Against Racial Profiling Studies, 6
MICH. J. RACE & L. 237, 255-57 (2001). Even this approach, however, has its pitfalls. It is difficult to
determine what the underlying rate of drug or firearms crime is; these are victimless crimes, and hence
neither reported crime rates nor the rate at which minorities and nonminorities are charged with these
crimes are good indicators of the underlying rate at which persons actually carry guns or drugs
unlawfully.
213. A type of "testing," involving the use of similarly situated minority and nonminority motorists
in order to determine which would be stopped and searched, was employed in at least one recent case.
Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 636-37 (7th Cir. 2001). Perhaps a more extensive pattern of
testing of this type would provide compelling support for a racial profiling claim.
214. See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464-65.
215. It is striking how even the most astute commentators assume that the authorities would have
no reason to consider a suspect's race except as a proxy for criminality. See, e.g., COLE, supra note 27,
at 41-55; KENNEDY, supra note 27, at 136-63; Harris, supra note 27, at 291-94; Rudovsky, supra note
10, at 306-17.
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race.2 16 Doctrinally, this conclusion seems impeccable; under ordinary equal
protection principles, a racial classification is present only when "the
decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' and not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
,,2 17identifiable group. In my hypothetical case, the police have focused their
attention on individuals who match a description, and not because of a desire to
investigate only members of a particular racial grouping. That is not an
impermissible racial classification. 218 It is far from clear, however, that my
hypothetical case is different in any meaningful sense from what many consider
to be impermissible racial profiling. Imagine that the police obtain intelligence
indicating that drug trafficking in a particular neighborhood is controlled by an
exclusively African-American gang, which sells drugs in open air markets and
utilizes a network of lookouts to warn sellers of approaching police. If
undercover officers attempting to penetrate the network begin their
investigations by surveilling the young African-Americans that they see
loitering in areas where drugs are sold, or if officers on patrol enforce anti-
loitering and other public order laws with particular vigor on young African-
Americans seen loitering in proximity to open air drug markets, they are no
more engaging in a racial classification than are officers that rely on a racial
identifier contained in a witness's description of a suspect. Instead, they are
merely conforming their tactics to the intelligence they have obtained. 19
216. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 44
(2001); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 242-43
(1983).
217. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (ellipsis in original) (quoting Personnel
Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
218. To my knowledge, the only dissenter from this view is Professor Banks, who has argued that
there is no principled distinction between race-based suspect descriptions and racial profiling, both of
which he believes should be treated as racial classifications subject to strict judicial scrutiny, although he
confesses that there is no practical means to eliminate race-based suspect descriptions. See R. Richard
Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48
UCLA L. REv. 1075, 1108-22 (2001). I quite agree that there is little difference between the two
practices, but I disagree that they must necessarily be treated as racial classifications. As Professor
Banks acknowledges, witnesses generally find race a useful way to describe an individual. See id. at
1109-12. Accordingly, when relating race as an identifying characteristic, the witness is endeavoring to
identify a particular individual involved in an offense, rather than suggesting that individuals be treated
differently by the police because of their race. And under current equal protection jurisprudence, it is
only when an individual is treated differently because of his race that strict scrutiny is triggered.
219. Professor Stuntz has made a somewhat different but closely related point:
Crime corresponds to local demographic patterns; in any given city, the population of
burglars or arsonists is bound to belong disproportionately to one or another ethnic group.
Some patterns transcend local conditions: Everywhere, young men commit a hugely
disproportionate number of crimes. Police know these things. They can hardly be expected to
forget what they know.
In a world where criminal organizations buy and sell drugs-and where other sorts of
criminal organizations use hijacked airplanes to blow up buildings-the problem is worse still.
Criminal enterprises are not equal opportunity employers.... [W]here legal protections do not
operate, ethnic bonds can serve as a substitute, a means by which market actors reduce the risk
of cheating by those with whom they deal. The same idea applies to illegal enterprises. It
follows that drug distribution networks and terrorist organizations, like Mafia families, are
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The same point can be made in terms of the justification for non-uniform
law enforcement that I advance above. The Equal Protection Clause does not
forbid the authorities from taking aggressive action to prevent crime only if
they do so uniformly and, hence, inefficiently. There is no requirement that the
police, in order to devote sufficient resources where they are needed, must also
devote equal resources where they are not needed, creating a formal, but highly
220inefficient, conception of equality. Indeed, the law enforcement response to
the threat of terrorism illustrates this point. If the authorities learn of a plot to
smuggle bombs aboard an airliner organized by a terrorist cell based in the
Middle East, for example, an effort to target passengers of Middle Eastern
origin for special scrutiny is an appropriate allocation of limited resources to
respond to a specific threat, rather than racial discrimination. As Professor
Stuntz has observed, "[t]he inefficiency of treating all airplane travelers the
same-should airport security officials really regard travelers with Danish visas
and travelers with Yemeni visas as equally risky?-is both great and
obvious. ' '221 Instructing immigration officials to devote additional resources to
investigating foreigners who arrive from countries in which terrorist
organizations are known to operate, similarly, is simply a response to the
character of the threat. 222 Indeed, the authorities would hardly be providing
effectively equal protection from this type of terrorist threat if they fail to
bound to have a racial or ethnic cast. The police, whether FBI agents looking for members of
al Qaeda or local cops trying to break up a heroin ring, are bound to know what the relevant
racial or ethnic cast is. If the law asks them to feign ignorance, the likely effect is not to reduce
the role that ethnicity plays in policing, but rather to reduce the respect the law enjoys among
the police.
Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2178-79 (internal citation omitted).
220. The Supreme Court made a somewhat similar point in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985), as it considered a policy of prosecuting only individuals who had announced their unwillingness
to register for the draft. The policy-seemingly based on an individual's exercise of rights protected by
the First Amendment-was nevertheless upheld since, despite its non-uniformity, the policy promoted
efficient use of limited resources:
First, by relying on reports of nonregistration, the Government was able to identify and
prosecute violators without further delay. Although it still was necessary to investigate those
reported to make sure that they were required to register and had not, the Government did not
have to search actively for the names of these likely violators. Such a search would have been
difficult and costly at that time. Indeed, it would be a costly step in any "active" prosecution
system involving thousands of nonregistrants. The passive enforcement program thus
promoted prosecutorial efficiency. Second, the letters written to Selective Service provided
strong, perhaps conclusive evidence of the nonregistrant's intent not to comply--one of the
elements of the offense. Third, prosecuting visible nonregistrants was thought to be an
effective way to promote general deterrence, especially since failing to proceed against
publicly known offenders would encourage others to violate the law.
Id. at 612-13 (internal citation omitted).
221. Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2179.
222. In one of the few decisions to date considering this type of problem, the court hinted at an
approach along the lines I have suggested, acknowledging that an evenhanded policy to focus
antiterrorism investigations on individuals of Middle Eastern origin would be proper if the "defendant
matched the alleged terrorist profile, and the government's newfound proactivity with regard to passport
violations was not a one-time selective exercise .... United States v. Al Jibori, 90 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir.
1996).
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acknowledge its non-uniform character. In short, when the threat is non-
uniform, the view of equal protection advanced here permits law enforcement
to make a non-uniform response.
Of course, at some point the information in the hands of the authorities is so
non-specific that it amounts to the use of race as a proxy for criminality, as
when narcotics officers tail individuals of apparent Hispanic appearance on the
view that the drug trade is largely controlled by Latinos, or when a vague
description of an offender results in the detention of virtually every African-
American male that the police encounter. While the norm of equal protection
against lawbreakers suggests that when government perceives a specific threat,
it may allocate resources to that specific threat even if it results in non-uniform
enforcement, no one could plausibly argue that the risk of crime is so racially
skewed that the government could justify the use of race alone as a basis for
making investigative or prosecutive decisions. As Ira Glasser of the American
Civil Liberties Union has put it in the context of drug-law enforcement, "[e]ven
if most of the drug dealers in the Northeast corridor or in any particular
neighborhood or city are black or Latino, it does not follow that most blacks
and Latinos are drug dealers .... .223 Thus, the norm of equal protection against
lawbreakers does not suggest that law enforcement is free to engage in any type
of racial discrimination in response to a perceived threat. At some point, the
relationship between the nature of the perceived threat and race or national
origin becomes so attenuated that the only fair characterization of a particular
224enforcement decision is that it involves the use of a racial classification. And
even apart from equal protection principles, the Fourth Amendment requires a
sufficient quantum of individualized evidence of wrongdoing before the police
223. Ira Glasser, Racial Profiling and Selective Enforcement: The New Jim Crow, BRIEF, Summer
2001, at 30, 35. For additional critical analysis of the claim that racial profiling can be considered a
"rational" form of discrimination, see, for example, HARRIS, supra note 211, at 73-90; Samuel R. Gross
& Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1413, 1427-36 (2002); Harris,
supra note 27, at 294-97; Rudovsky, supra note 10, at 306-14.
224. For example, in condemning the use of Hispanic appearance as a basis for making decisions
about which motorists to stop at an immigration checkpoint near the Mexican border, the Ninth Circuit
noted that the majority of people who pass through the checkpoint are Hispanic, making that factor
essentially meaningless:
One area where Hispanics are heavily in the majority is El Centro, the site of the vehicle stop.
As Agent Johnson acknowledged, the majority of the people who pass through the El Centro
checkpoint are Hispanic. His testimony is in turn corroborated by more general demographic
data from that area. The population of Imperial County, in which El Centro is located, is 73%
Hispanic. In Imperial County, as of 1998, Hispanics accounted for 105,355 of the total
population of 144,051. More broadly, according to census data, five Southern California
counties are home to more than a fifth of the nation's Hispanic population. During the current
decade, Hispanics will become the single largest population group in Southern California, and
by 2040, will make up 59% of Southern California's population. Accordingly, Hispanic
appearance is of little or no use in determining which particular individuals among the vast
Hispanic populace should be stopped by law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal
aliens.
United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1133-34 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (footnotes and citations
omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Sanchez-Guillen v. United States, 531 U.S. 889 (2000).
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can detain an individual.225 But it should be plain that it is far too facile to
226characterize any consideration of race by law enforcement as impermissible.
The critical question should be whether law enforcement is responding to a
meaningful threat from offenders of a particular race or national origin, or
whether it is merely employing race or national origin as a proxy for
criminality.
It should be added that the conception of equal protection advanced here
surely does not argue for a policing strategy based on the most heavy-handed
tactics possible within constitutional limitations. In fact, some evidence
suggests that aggressive policing is more effective when it is conducted in a
polite and respectful manner because it is less likely to delegitimize the police
in the eyes of community members. 227 Aggressive policing need not be
disrespectful policing. Indeed, there is every reason to insist that the police
remain polite and respectful even during aggressive patrol, and, through the use
of undercover "testers," to discipline officers who fail to comply with such an
approach. But respectful policing need not be reactive policing. In my view,
reactive policing will frequently offer no realistic hope of providing effectively
equal protection, and that is a constitutionally impermissible result.
In any event, under a norm of effectively equal protection against
lawbreakers, the argument that utilizing aggressive policing should be
forbidden because the police cannot be fair to minorities is deeply problematic.
The residents of impoverished high-crime neighborhoods should not be denied
equal protection from lawbreakers because the police cannot be trusted to
comport with other constitutional principles; it should be plain that the
Constitution demands that both of these norms be honored.228 The answer to
225. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). Indeed, the discussion in
Montero-Camargo on this point rests on the Fourth Amendment in addition to the Equal Protection
Clause. See 208 F.3d at 1134-35.
226. At least at one point, the Supreme Court appeared to be struggling toward a rule along these
lines in decisions suggesting that, at least for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, race can be one but
not the only factor that the authorities utilize when deciding whether there is a sufficient basis to detain
or search an individual. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562-64 (1976); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975); see also Thompson, supra note 30, at 1005-08.
227. See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 156, at 8-24 to 8-25; see also Stuntz, supra note 17, at 2171-74.
While the argument that aggressive policing may increase community resentment to the point that it
undermines norms of law-abidingness deserves to be taken seriously, the limited empirical data
available does not suggest that aggressive policing has this type of counterproductive consequence. See
supra text accompanying notes 176-182. And in any event, a respectful and courteous policing style is
likely to minimize this problem.
228. One of the few studies to test the attitudes of African-Americans toward the police and crime
suggests that this very point has not escaped the residents of disadvantaged and disproportionately
minority urban communities. Professor Brooks's analysis of a nationwide survey of African-American
households found that higher-income African-Americans are more likely than poorer African-Americans
to view the legal system as unfair to African-Americans, even though poorer African-Americans are
more likely to view the police as "gang-like." Brooks, supra note 40, at 1246-52. These seemingly
inconsistent findings suggest that the residents of high-crime neighborhoods themselves believe that
they should not have to choose between ineffective and abusive policing:
One might infer that poor blacks view the legal system as fair despite (or perhaps because oj)
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racial discrimination in law enforcement is improved training, supervision,
discipline for misconduct, and judicial oversight, rather than confining the
police to tactics that have no hope of affording the residents of disadvantaged
neighborhoods the same security enjoyed by the wealthy.229 No one would
argue that the police ought to refrain from engaging in searches and seizures
because it is inevitable that when they do so, they will occasionally violate the
Fourth Amendment; there is no more reason to refrain from aggressive patrol
merely because that tactic, if abused, will lead to constitutional violations as
well. 230 And the same point holds for other non-uniform threats to public peace
and order, such as the threat of terrorism: The nation as a whole is entitled to
effectively equal protection from terrorist threats, even though effectively equal
protection requires that additional resources be allocated to scrutinize
individuals who come from areas in which terrorist groups operate. In short,
equal protection permits a non-uniform law enforcement response to a non-
uniform threat.
CONCLUSION: POLICING AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
The view advanced here-that a more aggressive and proactive strategy
than that which inheres in the conventional policing model can be defended in
terms of a constitutional imperative--offers a new line of defense when
policing tactics come under attack as discriminatory. This understanding of
equal protection suggests that non-uniform policing tactics are not only
constitutionally defensible, but may well be essential to secure compliance with
the dictates of equal protection. But the implications of this view of equal
the differentially tough legal enforcement in their communities. This inference is consistent
with the argument that poor African Americans desire disproportionately tough legal
enforcement in their communities. However, data also indicate that poor blacks have little
confidence in the police. Poor blacks are more inclined to report that the police behave too
much like a gang to be an effective response to gang-related crimes. In the context of the
urban frustration argument, these findings suggest that aggressive enforcement with limited
police discretion may be consistent with high-crime black communities' desire for safety and
fairness. On the other hand, one may question whether it is sufficient that individuals in these
communities "choose" (from a truncated set of alternatives) to have harsher penalties. That is,
the basis of these choices must be considered when informing legal policy.
Id. at 1271.
229. There is a steadily growing body of literature describing the type of reforms that can be
utilized to combat racial profiling. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 211, at 145-222; Brandon Garett,
Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. REV. 41 (2001); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, With an
Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial Profiling, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 1409 (2000); Jerome H. Skolnick & Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs, and Profiling: Ways To
Target Guns and Minimize Racial Profiling, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 413 (2001).
230. Significantly, even the harshest critics of order-maintenance policing do not argue that the
police should abandon high-crime neighborhoods. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31. The
question they do not confront, of course, is what the police should do if more restrained tactics prove
ineffective in these neighborhoods. One could, of course, conclude that it is impossible to provide such
neighborhoods with effectively equal protection, but, at least in my view, a local government that
concludes that more aggressive tactics are warranted in an effort to provide police protection more equal
to that enjoyed elsewhere displays no infidelity to constitutional aspirations.
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protection are not confined to the analysis of policing tactics offered here; it
also bears on the character of the constitutional debate over policing. The norm
of equal protection against lawbreakers suggests that much of the current
debate over the constitutional principles at stake in policing is incomplete, if
not misguided.
All too often, the police are viewed as merely a constitutional evil-a
necessary one to be sure-but an evil nevertheless. In most discussions of
constitutional law, the police are relevant to the Constitution only because they
violate it: They search, they seize, they restrain liberty-their very mission is at
odds with the Bill of Rights. Much of the criticism of aggressive policing is in
that spirit-whatever its benefits, the critics contend, aggressive policing
creates an unacceptable risk that constitutional guarantees will be violated.
Once a constitutional obligation to protect everyone equally from lawbreakers
is recognized, however, the inquiry becomes very different. Aggressive
policing creates a risk of constitutional violations, but so does a failure to take
sufficiently potent steps to suppress crime. And for just that reason, whatever
its benefits, a reactive strategy for law enforcement cannot be defended on the
ground that it offers an approach that minimizes the likelihood of constitutional
violations. The argument for aggressive policing is not that the curtailment of
liberty it entails yields offsetting benefits, but instead that it may well be a
critical means by which one of our most essential constitutional aspirations can
be realized. The government may violate the Constitution when law
enforcement becomes too aggressive, but it may do the same when the police
are too meek. Let this be added to the many other dilemmas that those
responsible for law enforcement policy face.

